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ONE CENTIMETER OVER MY BACK YARD: WHERE DOES 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE DRONE REGULATION START? 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.* 
Albert J. Plawinski** 
The proliferation of small unmanned aircraft systems 
(microdrones) invites reconsideration of the limits of exclusive 
federal authority over aviation, which currently preempts state 
law. Public reaction to the drone phenomenon is generally 
adverse, putting pressure on state and local legislators to regulate 
drones. Many of them have enacted or are considering legislation 
and ordinances to do so. 
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Many of the state and local initiatives are poorly thought out 
and fail to recognize that microdrones can be quite safe, relying on 
many internal systems that cause the drone to land immediately or 
to return to the launching point if something goes wrong. Most of 
the initiatives ignore federal preemption. 
In regulating drones, the challenge is how to strike the right 
balance between allowing lawless operation and inhibiting the 
deployment of a promising new aviation technology.  
There is room for state and local action. The number of 
microdrones in the air is already overwhelming the FAA’s 
enforcement resources. State and local law-enforcement agencies 
must be able to reinforce the emerging regulatory regime and to 
have clear ground rules for doing so. 
State and municipal regulation of commercial operators flying 
within and according to the limitations of their FAA granted 
authority is preempted.Organized model aircraft activity under 
traditional rules of the model aircraft clubs is safe. States and 
municipalities should focus their regulatory energies on casual 
hobbyists and on commercial operators who are defying FAA 
regulations and exemption procedures. 
In the long run, a cooperative federal-state regime, modeled on 
that used for environmental protection and occupational safety and 
health may be desirable.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
You look out your back window and see a small drone 
(unmanned aircraft system) hovering a few inches over your lawn, 
driving your dog crazy, and watching you watching it. Do you 
have to figure out how to report it to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) and wait for the FAA to send an 
inspector, or should you call the cops? 
Since the ratification of the United States Constitution—
creating a paradigmatic federal structure for governing the United 
States1—new technologies have consistently raised new issues 
about the allocation of governing responsibility between the central 
government and the sovereign states that ceded some of their 
sovereignty to create the United States of America. Steamboats,2 
railroads,3 telegraphs and telephones,4 motor cars,5 wireless 
communications,6 aircraft,7 nuclear energy,8 the Internet,9 and 
                                                
 1 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1964) (explaining genesis and 
result of federal constitutional convention). 
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99–100 (2000) (reviewing 
history of federal preemption of state regulation of steam vessels). 
 3 See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S.Ct. 1261, 1266 (2012) 
(reviewing history of federal preemption of state requirements for railroad 
locomotives). 
 4 See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 
222 (1998) (reviewing the history of “century-old filed rate” doctrine and 
holding that state damages action was preempted). 
 5 See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70 (2000) 
(explaining federal preemption of state authority to regulate automobile airbags). 
 6 See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368–70 
(1986) (summarizing history of federal preemption of state regulation of wire 
and radio communications). 
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biotechnology10 each has raised questions anew about whether a 
more or less uniform body of national law, or a mosaic of different 
state and local laws, would advance social welfare the most. 
The proliferation of commercial drones reignites old 
controversies over state and federal power. Sold by the thousands 
by Amazon and other online vendors,11 and flown by hobbyists and 
for commercial purposes in a variety of industries, drones alarm 
privacy advocates, enrage anti-government zealots, make pilots 
fearful of midair collisions, and invite intervention by politically 
ambitious office holders and aspirants. At the same time, drones 
excite the entrepreneurial energies of private sector technology 
enthusiasts who have applied by the hundreds for governmental 
permission to operate them commercially,12 and who forecast 
hundreds of thousands of new jobs and billions in economic 
growth.13 
Drone regulation is inevitable, because like other flying 
objects, drones can be dangerous. Airplanes and helicopters are 
quite safe statistically, but even they occasionally destroy property 
                                                                                                         
 7 See infra Part III.C. 
 8 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) 
(rejecting federal preemption of state punitive damages award involving nuclear 
power plant). 
 9 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467 (2005) (noting how Internet 
technology provoked clash over state regulation of wine sales; holding that state 
prohibition of out-of-state wine sales violated Commerce Clause). 
 10 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (reviewing history of 
federal preemption of state regulation of drug safety). 
 11 See Jason Reagan, Drone Sales Figures for 2014 are Hard to Navigate, 
DRONE LIFE (Jan. 24, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/01/24/drone-sales-
figures-2014-hard-navigate/ (analyzing figures for Amazon drone sales). 
 12 See Section 333, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/ 
section_333/ (reporting that the FAA has granted 1,891 section 333 exemptions 
as of 19 October 2015); Snapshot of the First 500 Commercial UAS Exemptions, 
AUVSI, http://auvsilink.org/advocacy/Section333.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2015). 
 13 See The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the 
United States, AUVSI, http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/economicreport 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
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and kill people.14 Helicopters and airplanes operate safely most of 
the time in a century-old web of customary practices and federal 
regulation. The FAA sets standards for the aircraft, the pilots that 
fly them, and the procedures of businesses that operate them. That 
traditional legal framework is ill-suited to drones. The balance 
struck between safety and economic productivity for airplanes 
carrying passengers and helicopters performing med-evac missions 
cannot merely be extended to much smaller air vehicles with no 
one and, usually, no flammable fuel on board. This article focuses 
on the allocation of responsibility among different levels of 
government, recognizing that much civilian drone activity will take 
place close to the ground and within greatly circumscribed 
horizontal ranges—matters traditionally regulated by states and 
municipalities rather than by the federal government. This article 
provides a framework within which an intergovernmental tug of 
war among federal aviation regulators, states, and municipalities 
can be addressed. The author and his frequent co-author, Eliot O. 
Sprague, have been active in exploring sound drone regulation in 
                                                
 14 See Matthew Chambers, Transportation Safety by the Numbers, UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/ 
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/transportation_safety/pdf/enti
re.pdf (comparing aviation safety statistics with motor vehicle accident 
statistics) (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).  
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other published articles.15 This article is the final in a series of four 
articles.16 
II. DRONES 
Any regulatory initiatives, whether federal, state, or local, 
should proceed from a solid understanding of the technology to be 
regulated. Accordingly, this section provides a basic technical 
background, explaining benefits and risks of different 
technologies, before discussing regulatory approaches. 
                                                
 15 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 
VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. 
Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP Discipline: Training 
and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L. J. 143 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law 
Abiding Drones: What to Tell Clients That Want to Use Drones in Their 
Business, BUS. LAW TODAY, Oct. 2014, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/10/01_perritt.html. These 
articles assume, for the most part, that whatever regulation emerges will be 
federal and that drone-operator (“DROP”) behavior will be limited by 
restrictions imposed by private liability insurers and the prospect of tort liability 
for negligent operation. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law 
Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 439–44, 449–50 (2015). 
 16 This is the fourth in a series of articles about civilian drones, what the FAA 
calls “small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“sUAS”). The first article explores the 
subject generally, introducing the important distinction between microdrones 
and machodrones and focusing on the engineering choices that are made that 
produce actual designs of aircraft in these distinct markets. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. 
& Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015). 
The second article focuses more closely on vehicle design and explains that 
most of the rules contemplated by the FAA to ensure safe operation can be built 
into onboard systems. If drones may be sold only when they internalize aviation 
safety rules, the burden of enforcing traditional rules on hundreds of thousands 
of operators is eased considerably. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law 
Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015). The third article 
focuses on human capital. It proposes that bureaucratic burdens be eased by 
delegating much of the responsibility for drone operator (“DROP”) training and 
certification to private organizations, extending the model traditionally used for 
civilian pilots in the United States. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, 
Developing DROP Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143 (2015). 
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More important, regulatory initiatives should focus on actual, 
rather than imagined, risks posed by the technology, quantified as 
much as possible. In other words, risk-based regulation should be 
the norm. Drone regulation also should impose performance 
standards rather than detailed engineering standards,17 which freeze 
technology at a particular point in time and discourage innovation. 
Finally, the burdens of any particular regulatory approach should 
be weighed against the benefit it produces to the public interest. 
All regulation necessarily excludes some low-probability risks 
with modest costs, when the burden of eliminating them is too 
high.18 The FAA has embraced all three of these principles in its 
NPRM,19 in its approach to the section 333 process. 
A. Drone Classification 
Drone technologies are embedded in two distinct groups of 
vehicles: microdrones and machodrones.20 The boundary between 
the two groups is statutorily defined—anything weighing more 
than fifty-five pounds is a machodrone.21 The most popular small 
                                                
 17 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Albert J. Plawinski, Making Civilian Drones 
Safe: Performance Standards, Self-Certification, and Post-Sale Data Collection, 
14 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 13–17 (forthcoming Fall 2015) (explaining why 
performance standards are better than engineering design standards). 
 18 See id. at 14–17 (citing sources on risk-based regulation). 
 19 FAA, Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems, 80 
Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552, 9561 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to risk-based 
and performance-based approach) [hereinafter “NPRM”]. 
 20 The article ignores altogether toy drones, those costing less than $100, 
weighing only an ounce or two, and intended mainly to be flown inside. 
 21 The range from zero to fifty-five pounds is too large; a five-pound 
3Drobotics Solo presents vastly different risks from a fifty-pound aircraft. An 
appropriate boundary between small microdrones and big ones—which might be 
called “mididrones” has not been defined, however. Maybe it should be the 3 
kilogram/4.3 pounds that the UAS America Fund proposed for a special 
regulatory category known as micro sUAS. Petition of UAS America Fund, 
LLC (“UAS Fund”) to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement Operational 
Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
http://www.uasamericafund.com/assets/uas-america-fund-petition-rulemaking.pdf 
(filed Dec. 18, 2014). In the NPRM, the FAA explicitly invited comment on this 
proposal. NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9556–57 (inviting comment on micro-sUAS 
idea). Maybe it should be eight pounds or twenty pounds. 
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drones fall at the low end of this range, including the various DJI 
Phantom models22 and the DJI Inspire 1, all of which weigh less 
than eight pounds. The DJI Spreading Wings S800, S900 and 
S1000, the FreeFly Cinestar 8, and many others are a little heavier, 
ranging from ten to twenty-five pounds with their payloads of 
more sophisticated cameras and gimbals.23 DJI Phantoms account 
for more than fifty percent of the first 500 exemptions.24 
To facilitate navigation, virtually all drones have electronic 
magnetic compasses (magnetometers), altimeters, and GPS 
navigation.25 Most drones have autonomous safety features, usually 
including automatic take off, landing, and hover; automatic return 
to home at the command of the drone operator (“DROP”) or if the 
control link is interrupted; and geo-fencing, which keeps the drone 
within a certain distance of the DROP, below a certain altitude, 
                                                
 22 About DJI, DJI TECHNOLOGY, http://www.dji.com/company (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2015). See Snapshot of the First 500 Commercial UAS Exemptions, 
AUVSI, http://auvsilink.org/advocacy/Section333.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2015). 
 23 The most popular microdrone is the DJI Phantom, which comes in various 
models with prices clustered around $1,000. Options include a built-in gimbaled 
camera or a gimbal for a GoPro camera. The DJI Phantom, 
http://www.dji.com/product/phantom, is a quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 14 
inches. It has a maximum gross weight of 2.6 pounds. A close competitor is the 
3drobotics Solo, http://3drobotics.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/, also a 
quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 23 inches. It has a maximum gross weight of 
3.3 pounds. Larger vehicles in the microdrone category include the SJI S1000, 
http://www.dji.com/product/spreading-wings-s1000/spec, an octocopter, with a 
diagonal size of fourty-eight inches and maximum gross weight of twenty-four 
pounds, and the similarly sized Cinestar 8. See 
http://www.quadrocopter.com/CineStar-8-MK-Heavy-Lift-RTF_p_1156.html 
(describing Cinestar 8 HL). All of them have maximum endurance of about 20 
minutes and autonomous flight control and navigation features, including 
automatic hover, automatic return to home, and the ability to fly among pre-
programmed waypoints. The smaller ones carry GoPro-sized cameras on 2- or 3-
axis gimbals with the ability to downlink video. The larger ones can carry larger 
camera packages up to and including the Red camera used by professional 
cinematographers, and more sophisticated gimbals. 
 24 AUVSI, supra note 22. 
 25 See, e.g., DJI, DJI, http://www.dji.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); 3D 
ROBOTICS, http://3drobotics.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
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and excludes it from airports and other controlled airspace.26 Most 
of them can autonomously fly a flight plan defined in advance by 
entering waypoints, and modifiable in flight.27 
Microdrones share many basic characteristics. They are 
typically multicopters—quadcopters for the smaller products, and 
hexacopters or octocopters for the bigger ones.28 They all have 
electrical propulsion systems, powered by batteries driving a motor 
on each rotor.29 Sophisticated electronic control systems adjust 
vehicle attitude and orientation by varying rotor RPM 
differentially, obviating the need for most of the mechanical 
complexity on helicopters.30 Most microdrones have endurance 
within the fifteen to twenty minute range, and few have endurance 
greater than thirty minutes.31 With maximum speeds of about forty 
knots, their theoretical range is ten to twenty miles.32 As a practical 
matter though, the spread-spectrum wireless technologies used for 
their control links limit them to less than a mile.33 Microdrones 
                                                
 26 No FLY Zones, DJI, http://www.dji.com/fly-safe/category-mc (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2015). 
 27 3D Robotics, Mission Planner, 3D ROBOTICS, http://3drobotics.com/kb/ 
mission-planning/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 28 See All Products, DJI, http://www.dji.com/products (last visited Oct. 15, 
2015) (providing overview of product line, ranging from quadcopter Phantom 
series to hexacopter Spreading Wings S900 and octocopter Spreading Wings 
S1000); Ready to Fly, QUADROCOPTER.COM, http://www.quadrocopter.com/ 
Ready-To-Fly_c_70.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (summarizing available 
models, ranging from quadcopter Blade 350 QX3 RTF to octocopter CineStar-8 
Heavy Lift RTF). 
 29 See Aurelian lordache, TED - Drones, how do they work? The basics 
explained, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d250ix-
tyew (demonstrating and explaining basic microdrone subsystems). 
 30 DJI, supra note 28. 
 31 3D Robotics, Solo Specs: Just the Facts, 3D ROBOTICS (May 4, 2015), 
http://3drobotics.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/. 
 32 DJI, Inspire 1, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited Oct. 
15, 2015) (specifying maximum speed as twenty-two meters-per-second, or 
fourty-three knots). A speed of forty-three knots, multiplied by a flight time of 
0.5 hour, results in range of 21.5 miles. 
 33 See DJI, Phantom 3 Professional, WIKI.DJI, http://wiki.dji.com/en/ 
index.php/Phantom_3_Professional (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
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have enough thrust to fly up to several thousand feet above sea 
level.34 
Only a few machodrones have entered the market.35 Their 
design will not crystallize until users gain more experience with 
widely varying configurations. Machodrones are, by definition, 
heavier, approaching the weight of small airplanes and 
helicopters.36 They are more likely to have gasoline, diesel, or 
turboshaft propulsion systems to allow greater endurance and 
range than is available from the smaller vehicles.37 To justify their 
cost, they will have to fly beyond line of sight and at altitudes that 
will cause them to intermingle with manned aircraft. It is far from 
clear whether their capabilities will justify their higher cost, which 
is likely to be comparable to, or to exceed that of airplanes and 
helicopters in similar weight classes. 
B. Benefits 
The explosion of interest in civilian drones is fueled by an 
appreciation of their utility. Reporter Charlie Rose’s November, 
2013 interview with Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos accelerated public 
interest in drones.38 The reasons for the interest are clear. 
Microdrones can make aviation support—especially aerial 
imagery—available where it previously was impractical due to cost 
or risk of using manned aircraft.39 Microdrones have acquisition 
                                                
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., AVINC, http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/ (last visited Oct. 
17, 2015) 
 36 See Kaman K-MAX Aerial Truck: Built to Lift, KAMAN, 
http://www.kaman.com/files/file/PDFs/Helicopter%20PDFs/KMAXBTLProduc
tCard.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (providing specifications for this particular 
model of machodrone). 
 37 See generally High Altitude Long Endurance UAV, AVINC.COM, 
https://www.avinc.com/glossary/high_altitude_long_endurance_uav (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2014). 
 38 Amazon’s Jeff Bezos looks to the future, CBS NEWS, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/amazons-jeff-bezos-looks-to-the-future/ (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2015) (video recording of interview). 
 39 NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (summarizing benefits 
of microdrones). 
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costs two-to-three orders of magnitude less than helicopters and 
airplanes.40 Their operating costs are similarly lower, although 
crew costs may turn out to be comparable, if DROP compensation 
resembles that for pilots—the labor market for DROPs is in its 
infancy. 
The limited payload capability of the smaller drones means that 
they are primarily useful for aerial imaging. Typical applications 
include: event photography; aerial photography and videos for 
marketing of real estate and boats; aerial inspection of utility 
infrastructure, such as pipelines, powerlines, railroads, and bridges; 
traffic and breaking news coverage for television; assessment of 
damage from natural disasters; motion picture and television 
production; and crop inspection for precision agriculture.41 
Such applications have provided incentives for more than 
2,500 individuals and business entities to apply for permits to 
operate commercially.42 More than 1,900 of the applications have 
been granted, at the rate of 50 or so per week.43 
In the future, drones may be able to deliver packages and 
disaster relief supplies. Drone proponents project creation of 
100,000 jobs and $82 billion in contributions to economic 
growth.44 While this is likely overblown, the potential contribution 
to economic growth and employment is undoubtedly substantial. 
                                                
 40 A DJI Phantom 3 Professional with accessories retails for $1259. DJI 
Phantom 3 Professional Quadcopter Drone with 4K UHD Video Camera, 
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/DJI-Phantom-Professional-Quadcopter-
Camera/dp/B00VSITBJO/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1443147126&sr=8-
2&keywords=dji+phantom (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). A light helicopter, such 
as the Airbus AS350 retails for about $2 million. AIRCRAFTCOMPARE.COM, 
http://www.aircraftcompare.com/helicopter-airplane/Eurocopter-AS350-B3/233 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
 41 AUVSI, supra note 22. 
 42 Refers to section 333 exemptions, see infra Part IV.A. 
 43 Authors calculated this number through observation of new applications 
granted each week. 
 44 Darryl Jenkins & Dr. Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Integration in the United States, AUVSI (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.auvsi.org/econreport; see also Marcelo Ballvé, The Drones Report: 
Market Forecasts For Commercial Applications, Regulatory Process, And 
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C. Risks 
Because microdrones are lighter than helicopters and airplanes, 
the safety risks of using microdrones are lower.45 In the event of a 
crash, the kinetic energy to be absorbed is minuscule compared to 
that of a traditional manned aircraft crash.46 Drones also do not 
carry fuel—thus presenting a de minimis fire risk—and cannot 
carry people—removing the risks to aircrews and passengers that 
drive so much of traditional aviation regulation.47 
Operating a microdrone is not without risk, however. Even a 
smaller model such as a Phantom48 can cut someone badly with its 
blades, or create a panic if it approaches a crowd. Even small 
models can be quite heavy—a Phantom weighs about as much as a 
pigeon, and Cinestar 8 weighs about as much as a goose.49 Such a 
model could probably cause damage to helicopter bubbles 
(windshields) and airplane engines similar to the damage resulting 
from a bird collision.50 Microdrones can also distract people 
                                                                                                         
Leading Players, BI INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/aerial-drones-market-forecasts-regulatory-
barriers-and-leading-commercial-applications-2015-1 (forecasting $13 billion in 
annual spending by 2024, up from $6 billion in 2014). 
 45 A DJI Inspire has a gross weight of 6.5 pounds (2935 grams). Inspire 1, 
DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). An 
AS350 helicopter has a gross weight of 5,666 pounds. Eurocopter AS350 B3, 
AIRCRAFT COMPARE, http://www.aircraftcompare.com/aircraft-specification/ 
Eurocopter-AS350-B3/233/spec (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 46 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 673, 713 (2015) (explaining the relationship between weight and 
kinetic energy). 
 47 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (assessing risks posed by 
microdrones). 
 48 See AUVSI, supra note 22 
 49 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 50 The resistance to bird strikes is tested extensively before any airplane or 
helicopter receives an airworthiness and type certificate. 14 C.F.R. § 33.76 
(2007) (bird-strike test requirements). The large LiPo batteries and metal 
structural components on microdrones, however, absorb energy differently from 
bird bodies, and therefore testing beyond birds is necessary. See C. Fremgen et 
al, Modeling and testing of energy absorbing lightweight materials and 
structures for automotive applications, 6 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF 
ADVANCED MATERIALS 883 (2005), available at http://iopscience.iop.org/article/ 
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performing potentially dangerous activities such as driving. A 
driver seeing a small drone in front of her might be inclined to 
swerve and apply the brakes, potentially causing an accident. 
Additionally, the autonomous safety features of microdrones 
have limitations. The control links and GPS communications 
necessary for most of them are unreliable. It is common for a drone 
to fly away—a situation in which the drone ignores DROP 
commands and ascends beyond desired heights or flies beyond 
programmed or commanded distances from the DROP.51 
Machodrones create far greater risk than microdrones—a risk 
similar to or greater than manned aircraft. Because machodrones 
are heavier, they must dissipate more kinetic energy in a crash. 
Additionally, machodrones are more likely to carry combustible 
fuel. Their occupancy of higher levels of airspace magnifies the 
risk of mid-air collisions. The fact that their DROPs are on the 
ground makes it more difficult for them to honor the see-and-avoid 
principle52 that is the mainstay of traditional flight rules. 
D. Regulatory Approaches 
Risk-based regulation should be the norm. Drone regulation 
should focus on actual, quantified risks posed by the technology, 
rather than imagined risks, and should impose performance 
standards, rather than detailed engineering standards.53 Engineering 
standards freeze technology at a particular point in time and 
discourage innovation. Finally, the burdens of any particular 
regulatory approach should be weighed against the benefit it 
produces to the public interest. All regulation necessarily excludes 
                                                                                                         
10.1016/j.stam.2005.07.007/pdf;jsessionid=88323AD4366831CC573894B3D5C7
E018.c1 (explaining analysis of energy absortion capability of different materials); 
Pizhong Qiao, et al, Impact Mechanics and High-Energy Absorbing Materials: 
Review (2008), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/engineeringmechanicsfacpub/62/. 
 51 Perritt & Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. at 692 (describing 
flyaway). 
 52 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (imposing obligation to see and avoid other 
aircraft). 
 53 See Perritt & Plawinski, supra note 17 (explaining why performance 
standards are better than engineering design standards). 
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some low-probability risks with modest costs, when the burden of 
eliminating them is too high.54 The FAA has embraced all three of 
these principles in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).55 
The FAA has been studying civilian drones since at least 2007, 
when it published a Federal Register notice on drones.56 The notice 
described a process for obtaining approval for civilian flight 
through special airworthiness certificates. The process was 
extremely cumbersome, and mandated data submissions borrowed 
irrationally from the requirements for experimental airplanes and 
helicopters. Until 2012, the agency relied mostly on its slow 
moving advisory committee process to tell it how to proceed.57 
In 2012, Congress enacted the 2012 FAA Reauthorization and 
Revitalization Act (“2012 Act”),58 which contained several explicit 
sections requiring the FAA to move faster and ultimately to 
integrate civilian drones into the National Airspace System. The 
law requires the FAA to develop a comprehensive plan and a 
roadmap;59 propose rules, and then finalize them,60 following an 
incremental approach. It encourages the FAA to allow lower risk 
drones to be flown commercially while more complex issues 
relating to high-risk, heavier drones are being worked out.61 In 
section 333, it also authorizes interim procedures that would allow 
                                                
 54 See id. at 6 (citing sources on risk-based regulation). 
 55 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (referring to risk-based and 
performance-based approach). 
 56 Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). 
 57 See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), FAA, 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/ind
ex.cfm/committee/browse/committeeID/1. (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). The most 
recent posting of the Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles (UAV) Operations 
Working Group (WG) is dated 1991. 
 58 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11) 
[hereinafter “2012 Act”]. 
 59 Id. § 332(a) (1) (comprehensive plan); id. § 332(a)(5) (roadmap). 
 60 Id. § 332(b). 
 61 Id.  
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commercial drone flight in specific cases even before the FAA 
develops more general regulations.62 
The FAA issued the required comprehensive plan63 and 
roadmap in 2013,64 began a section 333 exemption process in late 
2014,65 and published a notice of proposed rulemaking for 
microdrones and mididrones in early 2015.66 The exemption 
process resulted in the grant of more than 1,200 section 333 
exemptions by mid-2015.67 Pursuant to the statute,68 the FAA 
established six test ranges around the country.69 The ranges were 
slow to take off for two reasons: needlessly cumbersome 
application and approval requirements were initially imposed for 
every drone flight on the test ranges; and the FAA was initially 
reluctant to give guidance on the research and demonstration 
activities that would be most relevant to its regulatory 
development.70 Under considerable congressional pressure, the 
                                                
 62 Id. § 333. 
 63 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Comprehensive Plan, FAA (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/uas
_comprehensive_plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 64 Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National 
Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, FAA (2013), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/ 
uas_roadmap_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 65 Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative 
_programs/section_333/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015); see Astraeus Aerial - 
Exemption Rulemaking, FAA-2014-0352, http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0352 (Sep. 25, 2014). 
 66 Supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 67 Section 333, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/ 
section_333/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (summarizing number of exemptions 
granted). 
 68 2012 Act, Pub. L. 112-95, § 332(c), 126 Stat. 11 (requiring establishment of 
“pilot projects”). 
 69 Test Sites, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/test_sites/ 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (announcing test sites). 
 70 Unmanned Aerial Systems: Efforts Made toward Integration into the 
National Airspace Continue, but Many Actions Still Required UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://gao.gov/assets/670/667346.pdf; FAA Faces Significant Barriers to Safely 
Integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System, Report 
Number: AV-2014-061, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (June 26, 2014), 
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FAA began to allow the test ranges to become more useful in early 
2015, by steering drone demonstration and experimentation 
activities to the test centers and by articulating more clearly the 
data needs for regulatory action.71 
The agency also has entered into a handful of cooperative 
ventures with industry to facilitate technology development which 
would enable broader use of machodrones. In particular, the 
measures helped facilitate technologies that would provide 
collision avoidance through automated sense-and-avoid systems.72 
NASA has undertaken a cooperative research effort to accelerate 
this technology development.73 
The content of the NPRM and the section 333 exemptions 
essentially make non-binding guidelines for model aircraft flight 
mandatory for commercial drones. The proposed rules include 
weight limits and height restrictions (below five hundred feet).74 
The rules also prohibit operation beyond the line of sight of the 
operator75 and the exemptions allow flights only over property as to 
which an operator has permission.76 The rules mandate avoidance 
                                                                                                         
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned%2
0Aircraft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf. 
 71 See Gerald L. Dillingham, Statement Before House Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Unmanned Aerial Systems: Status of Test Sites and International 
Developments, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669214.pdf (raising questions about 
whether test sites are being used effectively). 
 72 Press Release – FAA-Industry Initiative Will Expand Small UAS Horizons, 
FAA (May 6, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/ 
news_story.cfm?newsId=18756 (announcing Pathfinder project). 
 73 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the 
National Airspace System, NASA (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ 
armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-075-DFRC.html. 
 74 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9544, 9557 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21, 
43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183) (hereinafter “NPRM”) (summarizing 
proposed U.S. rules, compared with those of Canada). 
 75 NPRM 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9560. 
 76 FAA Exemption No. 11310, Docket No. FAA-2014-0608 (Colin Hinkle) ¶ 
27 (limiting commercial drone flight to property with permission for each flight 
from the property owner/controller or authorized representative), available at 
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of manned aircraft, exclude drone flights from airports and other 
controlled airspace, mandate careful pre-flight inspection and 
conformity to manufacturer instructions, and specify qualification 
requirements for DROPs.77 
Some of the proposed rules are controversial. The greatest 
controversies involve requirements that DROPs have a new 
category of airman license, maintain visual contact as opposed to 
video aided (first person view or “FPV”) control, and the exclusion 
of night flights and operation from moving vehicles. These 
requirements are consistently imposed in the section 333 
exemptions.78 The proposed rules eliminate the requirement for a 
traditional pilot’s license and substitute a new airman certificate 
called “sUAS operator.”79 This certificate can be acquired by 
passing a knowledge test tailored to drone operation instead of 
manned aircraft flight.80 Based on some comments received on 
DROP qualification, the final rule is likely to add an experience 
requirement and a flight test to the drone qualification 
requirements.81 
The higher risks associated with machodrone flight justify the 
FAA’s incremental approach. Beyond line of sight operations at 
higher altitudes are likely to await the results of research and 
development on new technologies for collision avoidance. 
International competitiveness adds to the pressure to get an 
appropriate regulatory regime in place. For example, Canada has 
moved much more quickly than the United States to provide 
flexible regulations allowing low risk commercial drone 
                                                                                                         
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/
media/Colin_Hinkle_11310.pdf. 
 77 NPRM § 107.11, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9586–9588 (proposed operating 
rules); FAA Exemption No. 11310, Docket No. FAA 2014-0608 (Colin Hinkle) 
at 5–9 (imposing operating limitations). 
 78 See generally Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FAA, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/ 
(last visited Sept 26, 2015). 
 79 See NPRM 80 Fed. Reg. 9544. 
 80 Id. at 9567–74 (discussing UAS operator rating). 
 81 Based on the authors’ analysis of comments filed on the NPRM. 
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operations.82 Amazon stresses in Congressional hearings and other 
public forums that it had to go overseas to conduct research and do 
demonstrations of package delivery by drones.83 Without prompt 
FAA action to get rules in place, drone design and manufacture are 
likely to move offshore. 
General rules proposed in the NPRM are unlikely to be in place 
before 2016 or 2017. Increasingly, state and municipal 
policymakers ask if they can do the regulatory job themselves. The 
answer to that question depends on whether state and local 
regulation of this new type of aviation activity is preempted by 
federal law. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of section 333 exemption holders are 
beginning to fly commercially. In addition, hundreds, maybe 
thousands, of others are flying drones for pleasure or commercially 
in ignorance or defiance of the FAA’s regulatory regime. This is 
the most serious public safety threat. The FAA has brought no 
enforcement proceedings for illegal commercial flight,84 and its 
resources will never permit comprehensive enforcement against 
drone outlaws. Supplementing FAA resources with state and local 
law-enforcement resources might help, but if legal restrictions are 
too far out of line with what is possible and safe, noncompliance 
will become an even greater problem, exceeding the enforcement 
resources of all levels of government. 
                                                
 82 See NPRM Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9557 (table comparing Canadian microdrone 
rules with those proposed in NPRM). 
 83 Ruth Reader, Amazon Spurns Slow FAA, Reveals It’s Been Testing Drones 
Abroad, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/24/ 
amazon-spurns-slow-faa-as-it-tests-drones-abroad/. 
 84 John Goglia, FAA Says Commercial Drone Operators Need Exemption. But 
Doesn’t Prosecute Those Flying Without One, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2015/02/13/faa-says-commercial-drone-
operators-need-exemption-but-doesnt-prosecute-those-flying-without-one/ 
(reporting that FAA policy provides “that legal enforcement action is to be taken 
only for ‘a violation that poses a medium or high actual or potential risk to 
safety,’ such as ‘when a UAS operation has a medium or high risk of 
endangering the operation of another aircraft or endangering persons or property 
on the ground.’ ”). 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States 
Constitution limit the states’ power to regulate drones, but do not 
entirely eclipse it. This section explains the Commerce and 
Supremacy Clauses of the US Constitution, then analyzes some of 
the case law relating to the interplay between federal and state law 
of aviation. 
A. The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause prohibits states from interfering with 
interstate commerce, while also limiting the scope of federal 
power.85 Because drones operate in interstate commerce, the 
federal government may regulate their use under the authority of 
the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the clause draws a rough 
dividing line between what drone regulatory powers lie within 
federal authority and what lie within state authority. 
Article One of the United States Constitution gives the 
Congress of United States the power “to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states . . . .”86 This 
provision, known as the Commerce Clause, grants federal 
legislative power and simultaneously limits the states. Under the 
“dormant commerce clause” doctrine, the states may not interfere 
with interstate commerce.87 
The Supreme Court has interpreted interstate commerce 
broadly. Interstate commerce encompasses commercial activities 
that have effects on interstate commerce, as well as those that 
                                                
 85 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that federal 
statute prohibiting possession of firearms near schools exceeded Congressional 
power under Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 
(2000) (applying Lopez to find that remedy provisions of Violence Against 
Women Act exceeded Congressional power under Commerce Clause). 
 86 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
 87 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1986) 
(explaining dormant commerce clause analysis and holding that state tax on 
aviation fuel did not interfere with foreign commerce with Canada). 
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directly involve intercourse among the states.88 Therefore, it is 
likely that the sale and distribution of even the smallest toy drone 
affects interstate commerce, because such products are sold online. 
In two recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the United States Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause is limited. In United States v. Morrison,89 the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that provided 
a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. In so 
doing, the Morrison Court reiterated three categories of activity 
that fall within the commerce power: “(1) channels of interstate 
commerce, (2) the instrumentalities, . . . persons or things in 
interstate commerce . . . (3) those activities . . . that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.” 90 
Focusing on the third category, activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce,91 the Court noted that federal regulation 
of intrastate economic or commercial activity has usually been 
held to be within the commerce power.92 
Because the violence addressed by the statute was not 
commercial in character, however, the Court found it outside the 
commerce power. 
The Morrison Court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez.93 
In Lopez, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute 
criminalizing possession of firearms near schools, because it 
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce clause. In 
reviewing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
                                                
 88 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding 
application of NLRA to local steel production labor relations to be within 
federal authority under Commerce Clause because of indirect effects on 
interstate commerce). “Although activities may be intrastate in character when 
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions.” Id. at 36. 
 89 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 90 Id. at 608–09. 
 91 Id. at 609. 
 92 Id. at 612. 
 93 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
328 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 307 
Lopez court noted Wickard v. Filburn,94 which held that the 
commerce power extended to homegrown wheat because of its 
economic effect on the national market for wheat. But neither in 
Lopez nor Wickard has the Court “declared that Congress may use 
a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad 
general regulation of state or private activities.”95 The Court 
concluded that “the proper test requires an analysis of whether the 
regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”96 
Applying that test, the Lopez court rejected the argument that gun 
violence might have an effect on interstate commerce.97 
Even though the Morrison and Lopez cases involved 
constitutional challenges to statutes, the limitations imposed by the 
Court also apply to administrative agency actions. Administrative 
agencies have no power not validly delegated to them by statute,98 
and that power must be constitutionally granted to Congress in the 
first place. A statute purporting to delegate a power the Congress 
does not have is a legal nullity. Therefore, if a federal agency 
attempts to regulate an activity outside the Congress’s commerce 
power, the agency action is unconstitutional, just like a statute 
directly regulating the same activity. 
                                                
 94 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942). 
 95 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).  
 96 Id. at 559. 
 97 The Lopez court held: 
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a 
local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had 
recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement 
that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate 
commerce. To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States.  
Id. at 567. 
 98 Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001) 
(holding that agency must demonstrate that Congress validly delegated power to 
it). 
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Together, Morrison and Lopez suggest that federal power over 
drones is limited. For commercial activity that does not fall within 
the commerce power, per se, the federal regulator must 
demonstrate a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. 
Merely because an activity is commercial does not mean that it is 
within the commerce power. To be within the commerce power, 
local commerce must substantially affect interstate commerce. The 
same touchstones for evaluating effects are expressed in the Lopez 
and Morrison cases; only the level of scrutiny is different. 
Federal restrictions on the kinds of drones that may be sold 
would involve interstate commerce; regulation of localized drone 
flight at low levels above the ground does not. Localized flight 
does not involve commerce that crosses state lines; it usually 
involves activity within the scope of no more than a mile. Any 
safety hazards are local—to persons or property nearby. Safety 
hazards to airliners carrying interstate passengers or freight are 
minimal, given the autonomous limitations installed on the 
vehicle’s control systems that keep them away from where most 
commercial manned aircraft fly. 
B. The Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause is the source of the FAA’s authority to 
preempt state and municipal drone regulation. The Supremacy 
Clause99 nullifies state law that conflicts with federal law. Federal 
preemption is of three types: express preemption, conflict 
preemption, and field preemption. Express preemption occurs 
when Congress expressly forecloses state law in a statute. Implied 
preemption consists of two variants: conflict preemption and field 
preemption. Conflict preemption occurs when a state law or 
regulation directly conflicts with federal law. Finally, field 
preemption arises when the pervasiveness of federal regulation 
leaves no room for state regulation. Usually a presumption against 
preemption operates, but not with respect to aviation safety 
regulation: 
                                                
 99 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
330 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 307 
[T]he presumption against preemption only arises if Congress legislates 
in a field traditionally occupied by the states. In matters of air 
transportation, the federal presence is both longstanding and pervasive; 
that field is simply not one traditionally reserved to the states. The 
Supreme Court has not suggested that the presumption against 
preemption should be interposed in that field.100 
1. Express Preemption 
Express preemption arises from an explicit statutory statement 
that states lack power of the subject matter. Federal law declares 
that “[t]he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of 
airspace of the United States.”101 This provision has been 
interpreted, however, as addressing sovereignty vis-a-vis other 
countries rather than the federal-state relationship.102 In Montalvo 
v. Spirit Airlines,103 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found no general express preemption in the Federal 
Aviation Act,104 and distinguished express preemption under the 
Airline Deregulation Act.105 
2. Implied Preemption 
Montalvo explains two types of implied preemption in the 
aviation context: conflict preemption and field preemption. 
Conflict preemption can exist when a state law conflicts with 
federal law, or when “a state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
                                                
 100 Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding 
that state common-law claims by skycaps for a share of an airline fee for 
curbside checking of baggage was preempted by the explicit preemption 
language in the Airline Deregulation Act). 
 101 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012). 
 102 Skysign Intern., Inc. v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116 
(9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting reservation of sovereignty to the United States to 
mean national sovereignty, not to mean preemption of state authority). 
 103 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 104 Id. at 470. 
 105 Id. at 474–75 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012)) (“A State . . . may 
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and 
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may 
provide air transportation under this subpart.”). 
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of Congress in enacting the federal law.”106 In some hypothetical 
instances, conflict preemption would be obvious. If the FAA 
mandates practice auto-rotations as a part of helicopter training, 
and a state prohibits practice auto-rotations because of the high 
incidence of accidents associated with such flight training, the 
conflict is manifest, and the state provision must yield. 
However, conflict preemption can be difficult to distinguish 
from field preemption. Suppose, for example, that an FAA 
regulation prescribes certain content for passenger briefings on 
commercial flights, and a state decides to impose an additional 
requirement that the briefing include advice that sitting for long 
periods of time can produce deep vein thrombosis. The state 
measure is preempted, either because the FAA has occupied the 
field of passenger briefing, or because adding to the FAA 
mandated briefing subjects conflicts with the scheme for passenger 
briefing the FAA envisions.107 In other words, the FAA 
prescription of certain content implies that briefer should talk 
about nothing else in the briefing. 
Field preemption exists when federal law so thoroughly 
occupies a legislative field “as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”108 As 
Part III.A explains, preemption cannot extend beyond the 
Commerce power. 
C. Preemption in Aviation Law 
In the aviation context, Federal law generally preempts state 
law. Some three dozen reported state and federal cases address 
federal preemption in the field of aviation safety.109 Some of them 
contain sweeping language concluding that the entire field of 
aviation safety is off-limits to state and local law. For example, 
                                                
 106 Id. at 470. 
 107 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 108 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 109 A Westlaw search on 13 June 2015 with the search terms sy,di(“aviation 
safety” & preemp!) yielded 36 cases. 
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Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,110 involved a state law claim 
for damages occasioned by operation of an airline transport in 
turbulence.111 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that state regulation of aviation safety is federally 
preempted.112 “[W]e find implied federal preemption of the entire 
field of aviation safety.”113 In early 2014, the FAA said: “[A] state 
law or regulation that prohibits or limits the operation of an 
aircraft, sets standards for airworthiness, or establishes pilot 
requirements generally would be preempted.”114 
State regulation can originate in a statute or in common law. 
For example, a state might pass a statute that criminalizes certain 
drone-related conduct and imposes fines; or give authority to state 
or local administrative agencies to promulgate rules, and impose 
civil penalties for their violation. Alternatively, a state’s common-
law can give individuals a private right of action for certain drone-
related conduct, such as causing injury or damage, or invading 
personal privacy property rights. Preemption case law discussed in 
this part involves both types of approach. 
In In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York,115 the 
district court, assigned multiple cases involving a Colgan Airways 
crash, held that occupation of the field of aviation safety by the 
Federal Aviation Act leaves no room for state safety standards. 
The court held that “[a]pplying state law standards of care would 
interfere with these regulations and potentially subject airlines and 
related entities to 50 different standards.”116 
Other cases, however, adopt a more nuanced approach, 
examining whether the FAA has regulated particular subject 
matter, the degree of conflict between federal and state rules on the 
subject, and whether the matter regulated by the state involves a 
                                                
 110 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 365. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FAA (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153. 
 115 798 F. Supp. 2d 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 116 Id. at 486. 
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subject within traditional state police powers. This section 
continues with a description of the state of the law with respect to 
different aspects of aviation. 
1. Aircrew Qualification 
A state’s prescription of qualifications for flight personnel is 
preempted, because of the FAA’s extensive regulation in the area. 
In French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.,117 the First Circuit held that 
state regulation of drug tests for pilots was preempted, because it 
intruded on the field of pilot qualifications, a matter regulated in 
detail by the FAA.118 
Similarly, in Ventress v. Japan Airlines,119 the court of appeals 
held that state employment claims by a flight engineer were 
preempted. The plaintiff’s whistleblower claims would have drawn 
the state court into deciding “backdoor challenges to [Japan 
Airlines’] safety-related decisions regarding his and Captain 
Bicknell’s physical and mental fitness to operate civil aircraft.”120 
The court stated that “[p]ermitting indirect challenges to aviation 
safety decisions under the guise of state law whistleblower claims 
interferes with the agency’s authority to serve as the principal 
arbiter of aviation safety.”121 The court distinguished Martin v. 
Midwest Express Holdings, Inc.122 by finding that state standards of 
care for airplane stairs were not preempted because the Federal 
Aviation Requirements (FARs) established no requirements for 
airplane stairs.123 
The Ventress court was careful to point out, however, that not 
all state employment law in the airline employment context is 
preempted, only those state claims that “encroach upon, 
                                                
 117 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 118 Id.at 4. 
 119 747 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 120 Id. at 722. 
 121 Id. 
 122 555 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2009). See infra Part III.C.4. 
 123 Ventress, 747 F.3d at 721. 
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supplement, or alter the federally occupied field of aviation safety” 
and jeopardize national uniformity.124 
2. Passenger Warnings and Liquor Service 
The Montalvo125 court held that federal law preempted state 
negligence claims for an airline’s failure to warn about the danger 
of developing deep vein thrombosis. The court reasoned that a 
state-imposed duty to warn would conflict with federal safety 
standards for pre-flight passenger briefings, and noted that the 
FAA occupies the entire field of aviation safety.126 The court 
reviewed the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act and 
precedent and found Congressional intent to “make the Federal 
Aviation Administration the sole arbiter of air safety.”127 It quoted 
Justice Jackson: “Planes do not wander about in the sky like 
vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to 
federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and 
under an intricate system of federal commands.”128 
Although the court expressed reluctance to infer preemption 
from the mere comprehensiveness of statutory authority unless a 
federal agency has exercised the authority to occupy a subfield,129 it 
found sufficient exercise of FAA authority to “infer a preemptive 
intent to displace all state law on the subject of air safety.”130 
Significantly for future drone regulation, the Montalvo court 
cited the “uniqueness of the aviation industry,” and went on to note 
that air transportation “requires more national coordination than 
any other public transportation” and “poses the largest risks.”131 
The court reasoned that national regulation is required because air 
                                                
 124 Id. at 722–23. 
 125 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 464. 
 126 Id. at 468. 
127 Id. at 472. 
 128 Id. at 471–72 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 
292, 303 (1944) (J. Jackson, concurring)). 
 129 Id. at 470–71. 
 130 Id. at 472. 
 131 Id. at 473. 
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transportation is a “national operation.”132 As Part IV.A explains, 
this is not true of microdrone operations. 
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell,133 the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that state liquor regulation was preempted as 
applied to airline flights. The Court cited Martin, but took a 
broader approach, using language that suggests that all aspects of 
aviation safety are preempted—appearing to agree with Abdullah 
that the statutory savings clause only preserves state remedies for 
violation of federal standard.134 Nevertheless, the alcohol service 
on air carrier aircraft is the subject of specific federal aviation 
rules, and that with state law, New Mexico was “seeking to impose 
additional training requirements on flight attendants and crew 
members serving alcoholic beverages on airplanes.”135 The court 
also noted the FAA’s detailed balancing of various considerations 
arising from alcohol service on flights.136 So whether the Tenth 
Circuit would follow Martin or Abdullah is unclear. The court 
backed away from, but did not overrule Cleveland, noting that its 
                                                
 132 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). The 
court held: 
[i]f the FAA did not impliedly preempt state requirements for 
passenger warnings, each state would be free to require any 
announcement it wished on all planes arriving in, or departing from, its 
soil, or to impose liability for the violation of any jury's determination 
that a standard the jury deems reasonable has been violated. Such a 
patchwork of state laws in this airspace . . . would create a crazy-quilt 
effect. Congress could not reasonably have intended an airline on a 
Providence-to-Baltimore-to-Miami run to be subject to certain 
requirements in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or in 
Florida. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended the 
sufficiency of the Airlines’ warnings to hinge on where each passenger 
on each flight was likely to file suit. As the district court noted, such a 
result would be an anathema to the FAA.  
Id. at 473 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court distinguished 
Skysign Int’l Inc. v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002), on 
the grounds that the FAA had not exercised its authority to regulate aerial 
advertising. Id. at 473. 
 133 627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010). 
134 Id. at 1327–29. 
 135 Id. at 1328. 
 136 Id. 
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reasoning has been called into question by subsequent Supreme 
Court cases.137 The court remanded, however, a claim for unsafe 
seating configurations, which required closer analysis of airline-
fare preemption.138 
3. Flight Rules: Aerial Advertising 
Federal law might not preempt state law on aerial advertising. 
Regulation of what aircraft may do in flight would seem to be at 
the heart of detailed FAA regulation. For example, parts 71, 91, 97, 
119, 135, and 136 of the FARs contain hundreds of pages of 
specific operating rules. The regulations do not, however, cover 
everything relating to aircraft. 
In Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of 
Honolulu,139 the Ninth Circuit held that local regulation of signage 
could be applied to banner-towing aircraft, notwithstanding broad 
federal preemption of aviation safety.140 The plaintiff’s helicopters 
operated under certificates of waiver (“COWAs”) issued by the 
FAA.141 
Because advertising is an activity traditionally regulated by the 
states rather than by the federal government, the court presumed 
“that federal law does not displace Honolulu’s regulatory authority 
over advertising absent a clear statement of the federal intent to do 
so, either by Congress or by the FAA as Congress’s delegate.”142 
The court found that Honolulu’s general signage ordinance was 
entitled to this presumption, but not a companion ordinance that 
singled out aviation by prohibiting any advertising on an aircraft.143 
Further, the court found that Congress has expressly preempted 
state regulation of aircraft noise and airline pricing, but not state 
regulation of aerial advertising.144 Although not mentioned by the 
                                                
 137 Id. at 1326. 
 138 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 139 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 140 Id. at 1117–18. 
 141 Id. at 1113. 
 142 Id. at 1115. 
 143 Id. at 1116. 
 144 Id. 
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court, based on the nature of the advertisement, the plaintiff’s 
aircraft would not leave the state. If the aircraft traveled between 
states while carrying an advertisement, the outcome might have 
been different. 
The court was unwilling to infer field preemption from the 
“mere volume and complexity” of federal aviation regulation145 in 
the absence of any explicit federal regulation on the subject a state 
seeks to regulate. It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
preemption should be inferred from FAA silence on a subject.146 
Significantly, it was equally unwilling to infer preemption from 
overlapping safety concerns.147 The Court was unwilling to read a 
provision directing the FAA Administrator to “prescribe air traffic 
regulations in the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe 
altitudes) for . . . protecting individuals and property on the 
ground.”148 The Court did not interpret this provision to “preclude 
local regulation with an identical purpose that does not actually 
reach into the forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight 
paths, hours, or altitudes.”149 Therefore, by negative implication, a 
local ordinance that did address flight paths, hours, or altitudes 
would be preempted. Finally, the FAA COWAs150 did not give rise 
to preemption, because they expressly required that the operator 
“understand” local laws relating to aerial signs.151 
4. Aircraft Design 
State regulation prescribing flight rules or aircraft design is 
preempted, despite personal injury cases arising from aircraft 
accidents involving questions of adequate design. The FAA 
                                                
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 147 See id. at 1117 (“Skysign notes that Honolulu justifies its ordinance based 
in part on the danger that distracting aerial advertising poses to motorists below, 
and it attempts to argue that Congress has confided to the FAA exclusive 
authority over such safety concerns.”). 
 148 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 149 Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1109. 
 150 14 C.F.R. § 91.311 (2015) (providing that banner-towing airplanes or 
helicopter require a certificate of waiver (“COWA”) issued by the FAA). 
 151 276 F.3d at 1117–18. 
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imposes detailed standards for aircraft design. The accommodation 
of federal and state standards in such cases is manifest, more than 
in cases involving aircrew qualifications and operating rules. 
Damages for personal injuries can co-exist with federal aviation 
safety regulations, however, as the cases discussed in this section 
show. 
In Lewis v. Lycoming,152 the district court interpreted Abdullah 
and Elassaad to hold that state products liability claims are not 
preempted on field preemption grounds.153 Instead, the court held 
that a successful preemption defense requires establishing conflict 
between federal and state standards, or at least federal regulation of 
a particular aspect of safety.154 
Many cases finding no preemption involve products liability 
actions premised on claims of negligent design, for example, 
Public Health Trust of Dade County, Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.155 
In Lake Aircraft, the plaintiff was injured in a seaplane accident 
and claimed that his seat was negligently designed. The Eleventh 
Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant, finding that, 
despite FAA standards for seat design, allowing a damages action 
to proceed did not interfere with federal regulation.156 
FAA regulation of aircraft design and manufacture is even 
more detailed than regulation of aircrew qualification. Preemption 
in this field of aviation safety is not complete, however. Cleveland 
By and Through Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,157 is an 
influential case illustrating this point.158 In Cleveland the court of 
appeals found that aircraft manufacturers could comply with FAA 
“minimum” safety standards and also comply with standards of 
care embodied in state tort law.159 
                                                
 152 957 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 153 Id. at 558–59. 
 154 Id. 
 155 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 156 Id. at 294. 
 157 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 158 Id. at 1444. 
 159 Id. at 1445. 
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Cleveland involved a claim by the pilot160 that his severe 
injuries in a crash were due to the negligent design of the aircraft. 
The jury found that Piper had negligently designed the aircraft by 
providing for inadequate visibility from the rear seat (from which 
the pilot was flying) and failing to provide a rear shoulder 
harness.161 Furthermore, the court held that FAA approval of an 
aircraft’s design “is not intended to be the last word on safety.”162 
The court observed that the FAA has given manufacturers broad 
responsibilities for assuring their own compliance by appointing 
aircraft company employees to “act as surrogates of the FAA in 
examining, inspecting, and testing aircraft for purposes of 
certification.”163 There was, thus, no conflict preemption. As noted 
in the discussion of O’Donnell above,, subsequent Tenth Circuit 
case law raises questions as to the viability of the Cleveland 
analysis. 
When FAA regulations are silent on the design of a particular 
subsystem, there may be room for state law. The Martin court 
interpreted Montalvo to mean that when the agency issues 
“pervasive regulations” in an area, like passenger warnings, the 
FAA preempts all state law claims in that area.164 In areas without 
pervasive regulations or other grounds for preemption, the state 
standard of care remains applicable.”165 The court rejected the 
proposition that the aircraft certification process preempts every 
state inquiry into aircraft design; the process only preempts those 
design or performance matters that are explicitly addressed by 
specific certification regulations.166 The court observed that 
airstairs were not “pervasively regulated,” and as such it was “hard 
to imagine that any and all state tort claims involving airplane 
                                                
 160 The pilot was flying a Piper Super Cub PA–18–150. Id. 
 161 Id. at 1441. 
162 Id. at 1445. 
 163 Id. at 1445. 
164 Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 809–10 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 165 Id. at 811. 
 166 Id. at 811–12. 
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steps are preempted by federal law.”167 The Martin court found 
support for its approach in Cleveland,168 and acknowledged that the 
Third Circuit takes a different approach. The Third Circuit decided 
that “federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the 
field of air safety” and thus generally “preempts the entire field 
from state and territorial regulation.”169 
Later, in Gilstrap v. United Airlines, Inc.,170 the Ninth Circuit 
embraced both Martin and Abdullah, adopting “Abdullah’s 
division of the FAA’s field preemptive effect into two 
components: state standards of care, which may be field-preempted 
by pervasive regulations, and state remedies, which may survive 
even if the standard of care is so preempted.”171 The court’s use of 
the words may and even if, however, still allows for Martin’s 
conclusion that preemption results only when the FAA has 
explicitly regulated the particular aspect of safety involved in the 
state lawsuit. 
Unlike airstairs, however, pilot qualifications and medical 
standards are subject to detailed FAA regulation.172 Thus the 
different result in Ventress, supra. 
                                                
 167 Id. at 812. (“Airstairs are not pervasively regulated; the only regulation on 
airstairs is that they can’t be designed in a way that might block the emergency 
exits. The regulations have nothing to say about handrails, or even stairs at all, 
except in emergency landings. No federal regulation prohibits airstairs that are 
prone to ice over, or that tend to collapse under passengers’ weight. The 
regulations say nothing about maintaining the stairs free of slippery substances, 
or fixing loose steps before passengers catch their heels and trip. It’s hard to 
imagine that any and all state tort claims involving airplane stairs are preempted 
by federal law. Because the agency has not comprehensively regulated airstairs, 
the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the stairs are defective.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 168 Id. at 811 (citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d 363, 367) (to find FAA preemption of 
a failure to warn claim, but applying a state law analysis to a claim that a 
navigational instrument was defectively manufactured). 
 169 Id. at 809 (quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 170 709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 171 Id. at 1006 (emphasis added). 
 172 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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5. Airport Location 
The boundary between state and federal authority gets murkier 
when states determine where airports can be located and what 
operations can occur to and from them. In this regulatory arena, 
aviation safety and traditional state control of real property and its 
uses overlap. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.173 is 
the leading Supreme Court case on preemption of airport 
regulation. In City of Burbank, the Court held that a municipal 
noise ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking off overnight 
was preempted, despite the fact that the only scheduled flight 
affected by the ordinance flew intrastate.174 
In its 5-4 decision, the Court focused its attention almost 
entirely on federal regulation of aircraft noise rather than on 
general aviation safety regulation.175 It emphasized, however, the 
interplay between operational restrictions to reduce noise and other 
aspects of aircraft operation. The Federal Aviation Act requires a 
“delicate balance between safety and efficiency and the protection 
of persons on the ground.”176 The court held that “[a]ny regulations 
adopted by the Administrator to control noise pollution must be 
consistent with the ‘highest degree of safety.’”177 It also noted that 
local restrictions on hours of operation would have a ripple effect 
through the national aviation system, and would limit the FAA’s 
flexibility in controlling traffic flow.178 
Several cases reached the opposite outcome, however. For 
example, in Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus,179 the Sixth Circuit 
held that a local ordinance180 prohibiting operation of seaplanes on 
                                                
 173 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 
 174 Id. at 625–26 (summarizing facts). 
 175 Id. at 633–39. 
 176 Id. at 639. 
 177 Id. at 638–39. 
 178 Id. at 639–40. 
 179 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 180 76 F.3d at 781 (The challenged ordinance provided that “[l]and may not be 
used for any of the following purposes, all of which are declared to be public 
nuisances: E. The mooring, docking, launching, storage, or use of any . . . 
aircraft powered by internal combustion engines . . . . J. The landing upon the 
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a city-owned lake was not preempted. The court distinguished 
regulation of aircraft in flight from regulation of aircraft landing 
sites, “which involves local control of land (or, in the present case, 
water) use.”181 It also distinguished City of Burbank, which held 
that a local noise ordinance was preempted because it interfered 
with airport operations. Aircraft noise, the Gustafson court said, is 
the subject of several explicit pronouncements by the FAA, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in the legislation 
history of the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control that 
embraced federal preemption.182 The Gustafson court also 
distinguished Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago,183 
finding local regulation of helicopter heavy lift operations 
preempted because it conflicted with FAA regulations on heavy lift 
operations.184 It also found in 14 C.F.R. § 157.7(a), the federal 
airport siting regulation, an express savings clause for local zoning 
and other land use regulation,185 and—citing a number of earlier 
                                                                                                         
lands, waters, or ice surface within the Village of Lake Angelus of any aircraft, 
airplane, sailplane, seaplane, helicopter, ground effect vehicle, or lighter than air 
craft.”) (internal quotations omitted). The city council declared that the 
ordinances were intended to “protect the public health, safety, and general 
welfare” of the residents, by preventing “noise, danger, apprehension of danger, 
pollution, apprehension of pollution, contamination and infestation from other 
bodies of water, destruction of property values, and interference with other 
lawful uses of the lake enjoyed by the great majority of citizens, including 
boating, sailing, fishing, swimming, and other recreational uses.” Id. 
 181 76 F.3d at 783. 
 182 “In contrast, in the present case, an examination of the Federal Aviation 
Act and regulations concerning seaplanes and aircraft landing sites indicates that 
the designation of plane landing sites is not pervasively regulated by federal law, 
but instead is a matter left primarily to local control. In contrast to the pervasive 
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise found in Burbank, we fail to 
identify any language in the Act, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
Act, or the legislative history of the Act, which by implication preempts 
enforcement of the City’s ordinances prohibiting the operation of seaplanes on 
Lake Angelus.” Id. at 784. 
 183 691 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
 184 76 F.3d at 787–88. 
 185 Id. at 784–85. 
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case—found that local airport siting regulation was not 
preempted.186 
Similarly, in Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul,187 the Eighth 
Circuit held that the denial of a permit for a heliport did not intrude 
upon exclusive federal power.188 The court found “no conflict 
between a city’s regulatory power over land use, and the federal 
regulation of airspace, and have found no case recognizing a 
conflict.”189 In Golden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay,190 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the creation of 
private heliports was not preempted. It distinguished heliport siting 
from matters that require national uniformity.191 
In Riggs v. Burson,192 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a 
state statute prohibiting heliports within nine miles of the boundary 
of national park was not preempted. The plaintiffs argued that the 
statute was aimed at flight of aircraft and aircraft noise; the 
defendants argued that it was aimed at the use of land and not the 
flight of aircraft.193 In agreeing with the defendants, the court cited 
Gustafson, distinguished Burbank, and found Condor Corp. 
persuasive.194 The legislature articulated legitimate state interests: 
regulation of “noise, disruption and safety risks caused by locating 
heliports near main roads and heavily populated areas.”195 The 
                                                
 186 Id. at 786. 
 187 912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 188 Id. at 223. 
 189 Id. 219. 
 190 390 A.2d 1177 (N.J. 1978). 
 191 Id. at 1181. “The case at hand does not present a situation where 
preemption may be predicated upon a felt need for a monolithic system of 
regulation. While in some important aspects uniform regulation may be 
required, that obvious need does not reach down to the level of the location of 
small, relatively isolated, privately owned helistops or heliports.” Id. The court 
cited cases supporting its conclusion that “state and local authority over the 
“operation and navigation of aircraft is supplanted by this federal regulation, . . . 
significant local power over ground operations of aircraft remains viable.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 192 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997). 
 193 Id. at 48 (summarizing arguments). 
194 Id. at 48–51. 
 195 Id. at 50. 
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court stated, “[W]e agree with the persuasive federal and state 
authority that has upheld laws which restrict the use of land for the 
operation of helicopters or other aircraft.”196 
In Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc.,197 the district court 
distinguished Gustafson and held that a private suit to enjoin 
operations on one runway of an existing airport was preempted. 
The litigation did not involve regulation of land use by a public 
body. Indeed, the airport was approved under state law.198 
In Harrison v. Schwartz, however,199 Maryland’s highest court 
held that certain zoning restrictions imposed on airport operations 
were preempted and others were not. It held that conditions in the 
conditional use permit dictating aircraft takeoff separation times,200 
and night-time takeoff times201 were preempted. The court went on 
to distinguish the use of local zoning power to ban a certain use 
from permitting a use subject to conditions that “affect air 
navigation.”202 
                                                
 196 Id. at 51. 
 197 96 F. Supp. 2d 820 (C.D. Ill. 2000). 
 198 Id. at 823–24. “In Gustafson, the issue surrounded a city ordinance which 
prohibited the landing or taking-off of airplanes on a city lake—not an airport or 
runway. In the present case, plaintiff is seeking to enjoin an airport from using 
its already zoned runway—a runway which is protected by a state statute. See 
620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/49.1 (prohibiting plaintiff from erecting any structure 
which would interfere with airport operations). Significantly, the plaintiff does 
not contend that the airport’s operation violates any ordinance or regulation. In 
sum, although plaintiff claims that he is seeking to regulate land use, what he is 
actually seeking to regulate is the use of the airspace above his property. Thus, 
plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the FAA.” Id. 
 199 572 A.2d 528 (Md. 1990). 
 200 “Aircraft take-offs shall be separated by intervals of at least 15 minutes in 
order to minimize the adverse effects of aircraft engine noise upon the residents 
of the surrounding area and to reduce the intensification of the use of the 
property in what is otherwise a primarily rural residential area.” Id. at 529. 
 201 “Aircraft take-offs shall not be made before 9:00 a.m. or later than 7:00 
p.m. on any day.” Id. (quoting conditions). 
 202 Id. at 533. 
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6. Environmental Regulation of Airport Activities 
Environmental regulation, especially when it is of a general 
nature rather than targeting specific airports or aviation operations, 
is likely to fall within state police power. A number of preemption 
cases involve environmental regulation by states and 
municipalities. 
In Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. East Haven,203 the 
district court enjoined local environmental authorities from 
interfering with construction of federally approved and funded 
runway improvements. The court held that the local governmental 
regulation was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act under the 
doctrine of field preemption.204 It distinguished Dallas/Fort Worth 
Int’l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving,205 as involving land outside 
airport boundaries.206 It cited Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena v. City 
of Los Angeles, in which the City of Los Angeles enacted an 
ordinance requiring a local airport to submit for approval any plans 
that involved development—specifically runway and taxiway 
construction—on airport-owned land.207 
In United States v. City of Berkeley,208 a case relied on by the 
Authority in Tweed-New Haven, the court addressed the City’s 
attempt to regulate construction of an airport surveillance radar. 
According to the FAA, the construction was necessary to ensure 
air safety. The Berkeley court held that the City’s attempted 
regulation was impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act 
because federal regulation of the area is so pervasive. The court 
reasoned that non-proprietary versus proprietary is significant.209 
When the local government is the proprietor of the airport, it has 
broader authority.210 It found preemption despite evidence of local 
                                                
 203 582 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 204 Id. at 272. 
 205 854 S.W. 2d 161, 167 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 206 Tweed-New Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 207 979 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 208 735 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 
 209 Id. at 941. 
 210 The proprietary airport doctrine logically extends to any territory that a 
state or municipality like a park district owns and already regulates extensively. 
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concerns about traffic disruption and adverse affects on the quality 
of life of local residents because of noise.211 
In Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands & 
Watercourses Commission,212 the Second Circuit held that local 
regulation of tree removal was not preempted. The plaintiff was 
privately owned and state-licensed. The airport argued that the 
trees were “obstructions to air navigation” under 14 C.F.R. § 77, 
and therefore that local limitations on removing them were 
preempted.213 The court distinguished Tweed, in that the local 
regulatory action at issue in Tweed “constitutes a much more direct 
intrusion of local authority on the preempted field of air safety.”214 
The court noted that the airport in Tweed was not licensed by the 
FAA, was not federally funded, and there was no federal interest in 
the airport’s proposed actions.215 The court also noted that the 
challenged local regulations did not single out aviation, but rather 
they were limitations of general applicability.216 The court also 
observed that the FAA exercises only limited direct oversight of 
small airports.217 
Therefore, matters within the boundary of an airport are more 
likely to be preempted than those outside the boundaries, because 
activities outside the boundaries are less directly linked to 
aviation.218 
7. Private Actions for Trespass to Land 
In addition to state and local regulation via statutes, ordinances, 
and administrative-agency rules, private actions for trespass to land 
also challenge federal authority. The common law of trespass to 
land recognizes the overflight close to the ground may be a 
                                                
 211 Tweed-New Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 271 n.13. 
 212 634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 213 Id. at 208. 
 214 Id. at 211. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. East Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d 261, 
271–72 (D. Conn. 2008).. 
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trespass: “Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of 
another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the immediate 
reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes 
substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”219 
Early in the history of aviation, the Supreme Court recognized 
that extensive liability for trespass would interfere with aviation: 
“The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is 
part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time what 
those precise limits are. Flights over private land are not a taking, 
unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and 
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.”220 
These principles suggest that drone flight over private property 
at the heights approved for microdrones under the Section 333 
exemptions and proposed in the NPRM could give rise to liability 
for trespass to land. While the advent of drones has extended the 
concept of air navigation and of the National Airspace System to 
levels lower than the traditional 500 feet, and thus extended the 
federal interest in regulating it to lower levels,221 the fact remains 
that operations that close to the ground intrude upon traditional 
property rights. The resulting tension between private interests in 
exclusive domain over property and the public interest in air 
commerce places greater emphasis on delineating the height to 
which property extends—a question which the Restatement on 
Torts,222 Hinman,223 and Causby224 do not address. A reasonable 
                                                
 219 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (2015) (discussing United States 
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946)). The Restatement suggests that 
“immediate reaches” of the land extend to 50 feet, not to 500 feet and that 
heights in-between, such as 150 feet would present questions of fact. Id. cmt. l. 
 220 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267 (holding that low-level flights by military aircraft 
constituted a compensable taking); see also Bryski v. City of Chicago, 499 
N.E.2d 162, 164–167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (reviewing caselaw after Causby and 
concluding that sole remedy for aircraft noise from municipal airport is action 
for reverse condemnation). 
 221 But see infra Part IV.A (evaluating argument that Commerce Clause and 
thus the permissible reach of FAA preemption does not extend below 500 feet). 
 222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (2015). 
 223 Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 224  Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. 
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rule of thumb is that a drone flying lower than treetop level or the 
level of utility lines commits a trespass, but not if it stays above 
that level.225 
Some general principles can be established from the case law 
discussed above. First, courts have held that the FAA’s extensive 
regulation in an area preempts state action in the same area. For 
example, regulation of pilots, employment claims by airline 
personnel, state liquor regulation, and aircraft design are all 
exclusively federal domain. However, some areas of regulation can 
coexist, for example, aerial advertising, airport location, and 
environmental regulation of a general nature. Second, states are 
also free to regulate drone operations when a statute explicitly 
saves room for state regulation, as in tort remedies. 
D. Interaction of Commerce Clause and Preemption 
The Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrine interact 
in determining the legality of state regulation of drones. Under its 
commerce power, Congress retains the authority explicitly to 
preempt state and local regulation, as it has done with respect to 
                                                
 225 This is the authors’ conclusion, based on the practical ability of a property 
owner to control airspace over her property. 
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economic regulation of airlines.226 It has explicitly forborne to do 
so with respect to state law remedies.227 
As to the more general realm of aviation safety regulation, 
Congress has not spoken explicitly about state power, but it has 
granted broad authority to the FAA and specified some details as 
to how the FAA should exercise that authority.228 The FAA’s 
details are in line with the many judicial findings of implied 
preemption.229 Therefore, the FAA could decide to adopt explicit 
statutory preemption of state regulation of drones, partially or 
completely, within the limits of interstate commerce. 
Federal preemption thus turns on a parallel inquiry, with the 
FAA as the focus instead of Congress. Although some of the 
aviation preemption cases make sweeping pronouncements of field 
preemption, closer examination of the cases shows, not field 
preemption, but preemption turning on whether the FAA has 
exercised its statutory authority with respect to a particular aspect 
of safety. The analogy under the Commerce Clause is whether the 
Congress has exercised its authority on a particular subject. 
As long as it acts within its statutory authority, the FAA could 
adopt a new rule that not only regulates some aspect of drone 
                                                
 226 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2012) (“A State, political subdivision of a State, or 
political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, 
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or 
service of an air carrier.”). Compare Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 
U.S. 374, 391 (1992) (state deceptive advertising guidelines preempted as 
applied to airline fares), with American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 
(1995) (state breach of contract action for violating terms of frequent flying 
program not preempted). “[T]erms and conditions airlines offer and passengers 
accept are privately ordered obligations and thus do not amount to a State’s 
‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment] of any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other 
provision having the force and effect of law within the meaning of 
§ 1305(a)(1).” 513 U.S. at 228. See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) (prohibiting state 
taxation air commerce). 
 227 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (“A remedy under this part is in addition to any other 
remedies provided by law.”). See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(c) (allowing landing 
fees for commercial aircraft landing or taking off within a state). 
 228 2012 Act § 332 (providing general guidance for FAA drone rules) 
 229 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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operations that theretofore had been unregulated, but it also could 
explicitly preempt state regulation. It could do so either as to the 
subject of the new FAA rule, or expressing its conclusion that an 
aspect of safety should go unregulated. As long as the FAA has 
done neither, states have a plausible argument that they are free to 
regulate the subject matter. Martin and Montalvo, discussed in Part 
IV.A, are examples of this kind of analysis. Having the power to 
define the boundary between federal and state regulation, the FAA 
or Congress could define a system for cooperative and concurrent 
state and federal regulation of drones, as Part VI suggests. 
IV. STATE REGULATION OF DRONES 
As Part III concludes, states are free to regulate drone 
operations when a statute explicitly saves room for state regulation, 
such as in tort remedies, or when the FAA has not exercised its 
authority on a particular subject. 
Additionally, the FAA’s approach to drone regulation makes 
room for some arguments not generally available with respect to 
traditional aviation safety regulation. While the FAA’s statutory 
mandate is to integrate drones into the National Airspace System, 
its approach to microdrone regulation actually segregates 
microdrones and keeps them out of the vast expanse of the national 
airspace where most manned aircraft operations occur. The 
approach relegates microdrones to flights below 500 feet, where 
airplanes and helicopters cannot operate safely, and also keeps 
them out of airport traffic areas where manned aircraft operate 
below 500 feet in order to take off and land. The content of its 
proposed rule and its Section 333 exemptions prescribe few 
operating rules beyond the height limit and a line of sight 
requirement—which is tantamount to a horizontal distance 
restriction. 
In effect, the FAA has said that microdrones can be operated 
commercially, as long as they are outside the national airspace 
system. The FAA has not admitted as much; rather, its position, 
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obvious from the content of FAR Part 91,230 is that airspace all the 
way to the ground is regulated by FAA rules.231 There is no explicit 
floor of the national airspace system, however, expressed either in 
statute or rule. 
A defender of state regulatory authority would argue that the 
combination of low altitudes and short distances puts microdrone 
flight, at least as the FAA would allow it for commercial purposes, 
outside the National Airspace System. Therefore, such operation is 
outside the realm of Air Commerce, outside Congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause, and beyond FAA jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the FAA has defined microdrone airspace that is 
inherently local and well within traditional state police power. This 
argument may prove too expansive, however, because it would 
negate FAA authority, and leave it only to the states and their 
subdivisions to regulate low-level and close-in drone flights—not 
only drone flights, but any flight by any kind of vehicle. 
A. Subjects of State Regulation 
Under the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause 
preemption doctrine, states may not regulate matters authorized by 
Section 333 exemptions, or any final FAA microdrone rule.232 
States may prosecute local offenses, however, and apply their tort 
law to traditional sources of liability.233 States may not impose 
DROP qualification standards, but can apply general employment 
                                                
 230 14 C.F.R. pt. 91 contains FAA operating rules for aircraft. 
 231 “The FAA is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground 
up.” Busting Myths about the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FAA (Feb. 26, 
2015), http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240. 
 232 This conclusion results from the case law analyzed supra Part III.C, which 
holds that states may not regulate matters explicitly regulated by the FAA. 
 233 This conclusion results from the cases analyzed supra Part III.C.7,, which 
hold that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state law remedies. 
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law.234 States may not require the registration of drones registered 
with the FAA.235 
If the argument prevails that the FAA has essentially defined 
the floor of the national airspace system as 500 feet,236 states and 
localities have plenary authority to regulate low-level drone flight. 
If that argument fails, or if plaintiffs with standing are unwilling to 
make the argument, the scope of federal and state regulation 
depends upon application of the case law, which yields the 
following conclusions. 
States may not regulate subjects explicitly addressed by the 
FAA in its NPRM and Section 333 exemptions—at least not as to 
the holders of the exemptions and once the regulation becomes 
final. That means that states may not impose different weight 
limits, height limits, preflight inspection requirements, accident 
reporting requirements, or periodic reporting requirements on 
operations. Thus, states may not impose different DROP 
qualification, training, certification, or experience requirements. 
They may not impose vehicle design requirements. 
Under Martin, silence on the part of the FAA is not enough to 
preempt.237 Therefore, the FAA had not preempted the field of 
drone regulation before it issued its notice of proposed rulemaking 
and began granting Section 333 exemptions, because it had not 
spoken. Now, however, the FAA has spoken. The Martin argument 
would be available only if the FAA unexpectedly does not act 
reasonably promptly to turn its NPRM and the comments it 
received into final rules. Otherwise, the defender of a state or local 
measure would be left only the relatively weak read of the Tenth 
Circuit Cleveland decision.238 
                                                
 234 This conclusion results from the cases analyzed supra Part III.C.1, which 
holds that states may not prescribe aircrew qualifications but may apply their 
general employment law. 
 235 This conclusion results from the case law analyzed in supra Part III.C, 
which holds that states may not regulate matters explicitly regulated by the 
FAA. 
 236 See supra Part III.D.  
 237 See Martin, supra note 122. 
 238 See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases). 
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Regardless, the holder of a Section 333 exemption would have 
a strong argument that the detailed involvement of the FAA in 
crafting the exemption preempts state and local regulation of 
matters covered by the exemption. On the other hand, states retain 
their authority to enforce generally applicable state and local law 
against disorderly conduct,239 public endangerment,240 refusal to 
obey the lawful command of a police officer,241 and refusal to 
disperse.242 The FAA has published guidance for local law 
enforcement personnel confronted with what they believe to be 
impermissible microdrone operations.243 Recognizing traditional 
state power to preserve public order, states should have the power 
to establish tort liability or to criminalize reckless conduct,244 
                                                
 239 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (2013) (disorderly conduct). 
 240 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-207 (1987) (criminal endangerment). 
 241 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-1 (2014) (interference with public officers). 
 242 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57–58 (1999) (affirming 
conclusion that gang-dispersal ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; 
explaining that laws criminalizing disobedience of police order are similarly 
questionable because of the possibility of arbitrary police orders); CA PENAL 
CODE §§ 409, 416 (discussing refusal to disperse). 
 243 See Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Law 
Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations, 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/FAA_UAS-
PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf. 
 244 Several states have criminalized reckless endangerment. In Alabama, “A 
person commits the crime of reckless endangerment if he recklessly engages in 
conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another 
person.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (West 2015). 
New York has both a first degree and a second degree reckless endangerment 
statute. Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree occurs, “when the person 
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical 
injury to another person.” N.Y. STAT. 120.20. Reckless Endangerment in the 
First Degree occurs, “when, under circumstances evincing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another person.” N.Y. STAT. 120.25.  
In Illinois, the law provides: 
Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. 
(a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means 
lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: 
(1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or 
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although this also is the subject of an FAA rule prohibiting 
reckless flight operations.245 
The Section 333 exemptions themselves do not address state 
and local regulation. The blanket COAs accompanying the 
exemptions however do. On the contrary, a note on the first page 
says, “This certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal rules or 
regulations specifically referred to above. It does not constitute a 
waiver of any State law or local ordinance.” 246 Further language on 
the last page says, “This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 
does not, in itself, waive any Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, 
nor any state law or local ordinance.”247 
                                                                                                         
(2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to 
another person. 
(b) Sentence. 
Reckless conduct under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
Reckless conduct under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class 4 felony.  
720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/12-5. 
 Additionally, such conduct has occurred frequently. See, e.g., Brett Snider, 
Esq., 2 Drone Pilots Arrested for Allegedly ‘Endangering’ NYPD Helicopter, 
FINDLAW (July 8, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2014/07/2-
drone-pilots-arrested-for-allegedly-endangering-nypd-helicopter.html; Andrew 
Holleran, Someone Got Struck By A Drone Outside Bryant-Denny Stadium 
Saturday Afternoon, COLLEGE SPUN (Nov. 19, 2014, 3:48 PM), 
http://collegespun.com/sec/alabama-sec/someone-got-struck-by-a-drone-
outside-bryant-denny-stadium-saturday-afternoon; Jim Hoffer, Exclusive: 
Brooklyn Man Arrested For Flying Drone Over Manhattan, ABC 7 (Oct. 18, 
2013, 2:54 PM), http://7online.com/archive/9292217/; New Yorker arrested for 
flying drone over US Open, RT QUESTION MORE (Sept. 5, 2014, 8:24 PM), 
http://rt.com/usa/185480-new-york-tennis-drone/ (news reports of drone flights 
resulting in charges of reckless endangerment). 
 245 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015) (prohibiting careless or reckless operation). 
 246 FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333 
Exemption No. 11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608 at page 1 
(Apr. 9, 2015) 
 247 FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333 
exemption No. Exemption No. 11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608 
at page 6 (Apr. 9, 2015) (“Should the proposed operation conflict with any state 
law or local ordinance, or require permission of local authorities or property 
owners, it is the responsibility of the operator to resolve the matter. This COA 
does not authorize flight within Special Use airspace without approval from the 
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But the fact that the exemption and COA do not “waive” state 
law or local ordinance does not mean that any particular state law 
or local ordinance is valid under the Commerce Clause or federal 
preemption analysis. If the FAA approves specific drone 
operations through the Section 333 process, preemption analysis 
says that a state cannot block the operations unless pursuant to a 
traditional police power not singling out aviation. 
It is unlikely that states have the power to enforce Federal 
Aviation Requirements (“FARs”) directly. States have no inherent 
power to enforce federal law.248 As a general matter, judicial 
enforcement of FARs is reserved to the Secretary of Transportation 
and the Attorney General.249 State courts remain open to adjudicate 
claims of invasion of privacy, trespass to land, and negligence so 
long as the elements of each tort applied in a particular drone case 
do not conflict with FAA rules. 
For example, a jury instruction in a privacy case that tells the 
jury it may find the defendant liable only if it finds intent to intrude 
into private activities in a manner that a reasonable person would 
find offensive,250 would protect the privacy litigation from 
                                                                                                         
scheduling agency. The operator is hereby authorized to operate the small 
Unmanned Aircraft System in the National Airspace System.”). 
 248 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
698, 708 (2011) (asserting that states have no inherent power to enforce federal 
law); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 263–64 (1972) 
(affirming dismissal of state parens patriae suit for damages under Clayton 
antitrust act); Connecticut v. Health Net, Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 
2004) (affirming dismissal of action by state to enforce ERISA; no evidence of 
Congressional intent to give states enforcement standing). 
 249 See Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp., 365 F.3d 81, 84–85 (1st Cir. 
2004) (holding that Congress meant to reserve enforcement of aviation 
regulations to the FAA); Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 
1996) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 46108 and holding that Federal Aviation Act 
does not grant private right of action to enforce FAA rules; affirming dismissal 
of action by former maintenance employer challenging dismissal for failing drug 
test). 
 250 The tort of invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion is defined as “One 
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive 
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preemption. The FAA does not address the intent to intrude 
element, just like it did not address the design of airstairs in 
Martin.251 Conversely, a jury instruction in a negligence case that 
defines the standard of care as flying no lower than 1000 feet 
above private property, or testimony allowing a jury to find the 
same thing, would result in preemption. 
As aviation matured through the twentieth century, landowners 
periodically sued aircraft operators for trespass and nuisance.252 
Most of the trespass cases confronted questions about how high 
above the ground the property owner’s rights extend.253 Above that 
height, trespass liability is preempted by FAA regulation. As for 
manned aircraft, machodrone flight is unlikely to engender 
difficulty with height questions. This question of the vertical extent 
of property is less prominent for microdrone operations. A 
landowner’s exclusive rights surely extend to 500 or 1,000 feet 
above the ground, as a handful of older aviation cases hold.254 As  
Part III.C.7 suggests, treetop or utility-line level is a good rule of 
thumb for the upper limit of property rights. 
States or municipal legislation or rules that target drones are 
more likely to be preempted than a statute or regulation of general 
effect, such as relating to noise, taxation, or environmental 
protection. Similarly, state legislation and regulation that specifies 
limits on flight profiles, crew qualifications, or aircraft design is 
                                                                                                         
to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. Law 
Inst. 1977). 
 251 See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text. 
 252 See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 
1936) (rejecting trespass liability for aircraft overflying private property). 
 253 Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (holding that 
military flights at eighty-three feet over plaintiff’s property constituted a 
compensable “taking” because it encroached on plaintiff’s property rights), with 
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (holding that high-altitude flight creating 
sonic booms did not constitute a trespass); see also Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. 
Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting trespass action 
against aircraft operator because no proof of actual injury to concrete uses of 
land). “The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as 
[he] can occupy or use in connection with the land.” Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 254 See supra Part III.C.7. 
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more likely to be preempted than initiatives that address matters 
not directly related to flight, such as business financial reserves, 
employee vacation or sick leave, minimum wages, or employment 
discrimination. French, Montalvo, and O’Donnell illustrate state 
regulation that intrudes too far into definition of flight crew duties, 
a matter regulated by the FAA. Conversely, Skysign is an example 
of permitted general state regulation of advertising, and Goodspeed 
Airport is an example of permitted state environmental regulation. 
If an existing or proposed FAA rule exists on a particular 
subject addressed by state legislation and regulation, it is more 
likely to be preempted. Montalvo and O’Donnell are examples.255 
But if the FAA has left a gap in its regulations on the particular 
subject, state action to fill the gap is less likely to be preempted, 
even if the FAA regulates the general area. The regulation of 
airstairs in Martin is an example. Under the distinction it draws, 
requiring state or local registration of drones already registered 
with the FAA is not permissible, because it conflicts with the 
federal registration regime. 
Moreover, preemption is less likely if a state narrowly targets a 
particular highly localized area of drone operations, and relates it 
to matters of traditional state concern, such as personal privacy, or 
security of property occupancy. Deference usually given to matters 
of traditional state concern, and the argument is stronger that the 
activity is outside the Commerce Clause. 
If a state incorporates Federal regulatory standards into its tort 
law256 and provides its own remedies when a plaintiff can prove 
violation of the standards, proximate causation, and injury, 
preemption is unlikely. Cleveland illustrates this point,257 although 
the case goes further in allowing state regulation. Abdullah 
supports the proposition,258 and the other products liability cases 
discussed in Part III.C embrace the distinction. 
                                                
 255 See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases). 
 256 The common-law doctrine of negligence per se is an example of such 
incorporation. 
 257 See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases). 
 258 Id. 
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The case law validating state regulation of airport siting259 
supports the proposition that states and municipalities have the 
power to specify where drones may take off and land, effectively 
limiting where microdrones may fly, given their short range. States 
and municipalities may not, however, regulate the height at which 
drones can be flown. Because the FAA prescribes a maximum 
height above ground level, justified by reducing interference 
between drones and higher flying manned aircraft, these 
requirements would be preempted. On the other hand, a state or 
local rule establishing a minimum height is less likely to be 
preempted because there is no FAA-established minimum height, 
and because of traditional police power to regulate land use. The 
cases involving claims of trespass to land by aircraft might suggest 
otherwise, however.260 
Limiting the purposes for which drones may be flown, for 
example, prohibiting flights for surveillance or to capture imagery 
of a particular individual, might be permissible. The FARs, while 
imposing different airman and aircraft certification and different 
flight rules for different purposes such as banner towing, med-
evac, and tourism in certain areas do this because of differing types 
of safety threats. A state or local law limiting purposes would be 
aimed instead at exercising traditional police power over privacy 
or land use. To the contrary is a recent student note,261 which 
concludes that state and municipal laws focused on drone safety, 
such as measures limiting flight altitudes or flights over populated 
areas, are likely to be preempted.262 
Conversely, state and local regulation of surveillance, justified 
by protection of personal privacy, may survive preemption 
challenges, at least if they apply the same limitations to manned 
aircraft as to drones.263 States should be able to regulate data 
collection, to limit liability for accidents, and to require liability 
                                                
 259 See supra Part III.C.5. 
 260 See supra Part III.C.7 and accompanying text. 
 261 Ray Carver, State Drone Laws: A Legitimate Answer to State Concerns or 
a Violation of Federal Sovereignty, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2015). 
 262 Id. at 404. 
 263 Id. at 404–05. 
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insurance, because there is no federal aviation law on these 
subjects, and because of traditional—and statutory264—state 
prerogatives over insurance. 
The airport regulation preemption decisions suggest that states 
and municipalities have more non-preempted power over facilities 
they own and manage than over facilities in private hands. States 
and municipalities likely have more authority to regulate drone 
conduct in public spaces than they do over private property, 
especially over public parks. States and municipalities already 
regulate access to public parks, charge fees, and determine what 
activities are permissible. Prohibiting drone flight without permit is 
a relatively simple matter to accomplish, as the Chicago Park 
District Commission initially proposed. 
The distinction between sovereign and proprietary 
governmental functions was enshrined in Supreme Court case law 
for a while with respect to the reach of federal labor law into local 
government employment.265 The distinction has largely been 
abandoned as a touchstone of labor law preemption, but 
conceptually, it remains viable as a federalism principal, 
contrasting, for example, local regulation of a private airport from 
governmental operation of an airport. 
B. Model aircraft and Consumer Drones 
States have broader authority to regulate hobbyist flight of 
model aircraft and consumer drones compared with commercial 
drone operations, because the FAA has been active only with 
respect to commercial drone operations. Section 336 of the 2012 
Act266 prohibits the FAA from promulgating any rule or regulation 
applicable to model aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, as long 
as they are flown consistent with “community-based” guidelines, 
                                                
 264 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2015) (saving state insurance regulation from 
federal preemption). 
 265 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 
541–43 (1985) (discussing unworkability of proprietary/governmental function 
distinction). 
 266 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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as a part of “community based programming,” and not near 
airports. The reference to community-based guidelines is generally 
understood to mean guidelines issued by the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics.267 The reference to “programming” probably means as 
a part of a local model aircraft club-sponsored outing.268 
The Conference Report on the 2012 Act explains: 
In this section the term “nationwide community-based organization” is 
intended to mean a membership based association that represents the 
aeromodeling community within the United States; provides its 
members a comprehensive set of safety guidelines that underscores safe 
aeromodeling operations within the National Airspace System and the 
protection and safety of the general public on the ground; develops and 
maintains mutually supportive programming with educational 
institutions, government entities and other aviation associations; and 
acts as a liaison with government agencies as an advocate for its 
members.269 
Section 336 also says nothing about state or local regulations, 
and its withholding of authority for the FAA leaves a relatively 
clear field for states to regulate model aircraft operations. 
The safe harbor for model aircraft is written around traditional 
practices of well-organized and long-established model aircraft 
hobbyist organizations such as the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics. In a traditional model aircraft club, Radio-Controlled 
(“RC”) hobbyists get together at designated fields as a group and 
cooperatively fly their aircraft, usually with one person serving as 
the pilot, and the second serving as an observer. Adherence to safe 
practices depends on the culture of a particular group and the 
dynamics of interaction on a particular day. All clubs have rules,270 
however, both general and specific for operations for any particular 
field, and the club members generally follow them, exerting social 
pressure on anyone who deviates. On a visit to an RC hobbyist 
                                                
 267 ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
 268 This is the author’s opinion. 
 269 H.R. Rep. No. 112-381, at 199 (2012) (Conf. Rep.). 
 270 See Academy of Model Aeronautics National Model Aircraft Safety Code, 
ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.pdf. 
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field, one encounters hobbyists with their RC airplanes flying them 
in pairs, talking and joking about their planes and past exploits.271 
They all know each other. It unlikely that one of them would stray 
too far from the norm and risk getting kicked out of the club. 
If a club member becomes interested in drones, and buys a DJI 
Phantom or 3DR Solo, he is likely to fly it according to the rules, 
unless he decides to try to make money with it. Then, the pathway 
of the section 333 exemption process and the eventual final rule for 
sUAS are available. His habit of compliance with RC club rules 
and his general awareness of the FAA probably will cause him to 
comply rather than just to ignore the restrictions on commercial 
microdrone flight. 
Hence, the operation of drones by organized RC hobbyists does 
not pose significant new threat to other aircraft or to the citizenry 
in general. Hobbyists have a good safety record, and commercial 
microdrone operators are unlikely to put their exemptions and 
certificates at risk by flouting the FAA’s detail rules for 
commercial operations —whatever their eventual content. 
The new threat comes from a different quarter: from the 
thousands of people who got microdrones as Christmas or birthday 
presents, but have no prior connection with an RC model club or 
any prior interest in tinkering with model aircraft.272 Based on the 
more-than 1,600 section 333 exemptions that have been granted 
and the much larger number of pending petitions, some the users 
are entrepreneurs, especially photographers, freelance journalist, 
civil engineers, surveyors. The vast majority of these casual 
purchasers, however, do not plan on starting a business or making 
arrangements to fly their drones as a part of an RC club activity. 
Instead, they take their drones out into their backyards, local parks, 
and nearby school grounds and fly for fun. When they go to a 
sporting event, a music festival, a vacation location, or some other 
                                                
 271 Based on personal observations by co-author Perritt during a July 2015 
visit to the Blue Max RC Club Flying Field, Buffalo Grove, IL. 
 272 Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 407–18 (2015) (explaining lack of 
community-based adherence to rules by casual drone users). 
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recreational gathering, they will think about taking their drone for 
the same reason they take their cameras: to get some good imagery 
for their Facebook pages and to record videos for YouTube. 
Indeed, recent events have confirmed this new threat. The 
drone that landed on the White House lawn273 was not being flown 
for commercial purposes; it was flown for fun in connection with 
an alcohol-fueled party. Likewise, the incident in King County 
Washington274 involved recreational, rather than commercial, drone 
flight. 
Arguably, these consumer operations fall outside the statutory 
safe harbor for RC hobbyists anyway. Such operations are not 
“operated in accordance with a community based set of safety 
guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide 
community-based organization.”275 
Enough ambiguity exists in the language to support broad 
claims that the Congress has placed all forms of consumer drone 
activity beyond the FAA’s reach. The statute may be amended, of 
course, as S.1608 proposes to do. But any proposed amendment is 
likely to face ferocious opposition from the RC hobbyist 
community276 and therefore passage of such an amendment is 
uncertain. Even if S.1608 becomes law, or if the FAA decides to 
impose automation performance requirements on microdrones as a 
prerequisite for sale,277 anarchy will be the norm for consumer 
drones unless states and municipalities supplement FAA 
enforcement resources. If states and municipalities decide to step 
                                                
 273 Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, White House Drone Crash 
Described as a U.S. Worker’s Drunken Lark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html?_r=0. 
 274 Graham Johnson, FAA investigating drone flying near news helicopters, 
KIROTV (March 17, 2015), http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/faa-investigating-
drone-flying-near-news-helicopte/nkYk7/ (reporting on near miss between drone 
and news helicopters). 
 275 2012 Act § 336(a)(2). 
 276 Nearly half of the comments filed on the NPRM were from hobbyists 
opposing FAA regulation of model aircraft. 
 277 Its current authority to do so is uncertain. Compare statutory language for 
motor vehicle regulation and electronic device regulation with FAA’s authority. 
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in, the preemption barriers are modest. States have a long history 
of regulating recreational activity that may pose safety problems: 
hunting, archery, recreational boating, and all-terrain vehicles.278 
Requiring consumer drones to fly at low altitude, stay within line 
of sight of the operator, not to fly over people, and only to fly in 
public parks with a permit is not likely to interfere with 
commercial microdrone operations or to interfere with the 
operation of the National Airspace System.279 
State and local regulation of consumer drones will have little 
adverse effect on the economics of commercial drone operation, 
because they are not being flown commercially—if the consumer 
drone regulations exclude commercial microdrone operations 
conducted under FAA rules and approvals.280 Limiting state and 
local regulation to risk-based and performance-oriented rules is a 
good idea anyway, but even if they are not so limited, the adverse 
effect on commercial designs may be limited because of a growing 
differentiation between consumer designs and even low-end 
commercial designs.281 
The matters outlined in Part IV.A that are off-limits to state and 
local regulations of commercial drone activity are permissible 
subjects for state and local regulation of recreational drone activity. 
If states exercise that authority, they can be significant contributors 
to public safety and other legitimate state interests. 
                                                
 278 This puts states in a strong position under the first criterion set forth in Part 
IV.C.1. 
 279 This puts states in a strong position under the second criterion set forth in 
Part IV.C.2. 
 280 This puts states in a strong position under the third criterion set forth in 
Part IV.C.3. 
 281 This puts states in a strong position under the fourth criterion set forth in 
Part IV.C.4. 
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C. State and Local Initiatives 
Only a handful of states have enacted statutes limiting the 
operation of drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or “UAVs”).282 
Most of these laws prevent law enforcement use of drones for 
evidence gathering without appropriate search warrants. Some of 
these limitations prohibit law enforcement and citizens from 
weaponizing drones. Some heighten privacy protection by 
prohibiting aerial surveillance without consent. A few statutes limit 
drone involvement in hunting. The table on pages 59 through 62 
lists the statutes and is followed by a discussion of specific 
statutory provisions and an evaluation of the likelihood of federal 
preemption. 
State Citation Approved / 
Effective 
Summary 
Fla. C.S.C.S.S.S.B 766 
Freedom from 
Unwarranted 
Surveillance Act 
Approved: 
May 14, 2015  
Prohibits law enforcement use to 
gather evidence; prohibits 
recording an image of a privately 
owned property or of the owner 
(tenant, occupant, invitee etc.) 
violating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
Exceptions: police use with a  
warrant, “performance of 
reasonable tasks” within the 
scope of one’s license, property 
appraisals, utility inspection, 
mapping, delivering cargo (if 
FAA compliant). 
Idaho IC 21-213 Approved: 
Apr. 11, 2013 
Effective: 
July 13, 2013 
No law enforcement searches 
without a warrant; no aerial 
photography without prior 
consent. 
                                                
282 Specifically, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed laws.  
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State Citation Approved / 
Effective 
Summary 
Ill. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/48-3 
Freedom from Drone 
Surveillance Act 
 Prohibits law enforcement use 
of drones without a warrant; 
no drone interference with 
hunters 
Ind. IC 35-33-5-9 Approved: 
July 1, 2014 
No law enforcement use without 
a warrant 
Iowa HF 2289 Approved: 
May 23, 2014 
No drones for traffic law 
enforcement; evidence obtained 
without warrant is inadmissible.   
Md. SB 370 Approved: 
May 12, 2015 
Effective: 
July 1, 2015 
Only the state can make drone 
laws (preempts counties and 
local ordinances).  
Miss. SB 2022 Approved: 
Apr. 23, 2015 
Defines felonious trespass to 
include peeping through a 
window, hole, or opening with a 
drone; prohibits photographs and 
video of people without consent  
Mont. HB 330 Approved: 
Apr. 23, 2015 
Effective: 
Oct. 1, 2015 
No weaponized or armored 
drones for law enforcement  
Nev. AB 236 
 
 
 No person shall weaponize a 
drone or operate a weaponized 
drone; no operation within 500ft 
or 250ft vertically from a critical 
facility and 5 miles from airport 
without consent; right of action 
(trespass) if drone is less than 
250ft over property and property 
owner notifies DROP that the 
flight is unauthorized; no use for 
law enforcement to collect 
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State Citation Approved / 
Effective 
Summary 
evidence. Creates a public 
registry of all state operated 
drones. 
N.H. SB 222 Fish and 
Game—Animal—
Harassment 
Approved: 
May 7, 2015 
Effective: 
Jan. 1, 2016 
No activity that disturbs animals 
with intent to prevent their 
lawful taking; no drone use with 
intent to conduct video 
surveillance of citizen lawfully 
hunting, finishing, or trapping, 
without prior consent. 
N.D. HB 1328 Approved: 
Apr. 15, 2015 
Evidence obtained by a drone 
not admissible as evidence 
without a search warrant; law 
enforcement cannot use drone 
footage as a basis for probable 
cause; no lethal weapons on a 
drone. Does not prohibit drone 
usage for research and 
development by educational 
institution.  
Or. HB 2534 Fish and 
Game—Fish and 
Wildlife Comm’n—
Drone Regulation 
HB 2354: only 
definition of drone 
changed to 
“unmanned aircraft 
system” 
Approved: 
May 12, 2015 
Prohibits use of drones related to 
pursuit of wildlife (angling, 
hunting, trapping) or aiding 
through use of drones to harass, 
track, locate, or scout wildlife, 
and interfere with angling, 
hunting, and trapping. The 
definition of drone includes 
unmanned water-based vehicles.  
Tenn. HB 153 Crimes and 
Offenses—
Drones—
Photography and 
Pictures 
Approved: 
Apr. 20, 2015 
Effective: 
July 1, 2015 
No operation over events with 
100+ attendees for a ticketed 
event; no flight around 
fireworks without event 
organizer’s consent. 
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State Citation Approved / 
Effective 
Summary 
Tex. 423.008  Law enforcement must submit a 
report of drone use to the 
governor.  
Utah HB 296 Approved: 
Mar. 27, 2015 
Evidence obtained by a drone 
not admissible as evidence 
without a search warrant. 
W. 
Va. 
HB 2515 Wildlife—
Animals—Weapons 
Approved: 
Apr. 2, 2015 
Prohibits hunting with drone. 
Wis. WSA 941.292 
WSA 175.55 
Approved: 
Apr. 10, 2014 
No weaponized drones; no law 
enforcement use without a 
warrant.  
1.  Law Enforcement  
The drone statutes reinforce the constitutional limitation on 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This prevents law enforcement 
from taking advantage of a new technology to conduct warrantless 
searches.  
Some states prohibit law enforcement from gathering evidence 
without a search warrant. In Illinois, law enforcement “may not use 
a drone to gather information”283 unless it obtains a search warrant 
prior to the search.284 Law enforcement agents may use drones in 
certain circumstances like crime scene and traffic investigation.285 
Wisconsin and Indiana, like Illinois, prohibit the use of drones to 
gather evidence without a search warrant.286 Violation results in 
                                                
283 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 167/10 (West 2014). 
284 Id. § 167/15 (2). 
285 Id. § 167/15 (5) (confines law enforcement drone operation to the 
geographic location and imposes a time limit on investigation).  
286 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-9 
(West 2014). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
21-213 (West 2013), IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.15 (West 2014); 2015 Nev. Stat. 
ch. 327, 2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (H.B. 1328) (prohibiting drone use to gather 
evidence without a search warrant). 
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inadmissibility of the evidence. In addition, North Dakota prohibits 
use of drone imagery to establish probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant that would lead to drone captured evidence.287  
Some states prohibit—or propose to prohibit—law 
enforcement from weaponizing a drone.288 In addition to 
weaponizing a drone, Wisconsin prohibits law enforcement from 
equipping a drone with armor.289 Other states extend this 
prohibition to civilian drone operations.290 
Texas addresses concerns about law enforcement abuse but not 
limiting drone use. The Texas statute does not explicitly require a 
search warrant when law enforcement conducts an aerial search to 
gather evidence using a drone.291 It merely requires that the law 
enforcement agency must, every two years, submit a written report 
to the governor, the governor lieutenant, and each member of the 
state legislature with a list of drone missions, costs of operating 
and maintaining a drone, and a list of non-criminal drone 
investigations.292  
2. Privacy 
States with drone privacy statutes address the fear of citizens 
using drones as “prying eyes” to collect information about their 
neighbors from an aerial vantage point. The statutes prohibit aerial 
imagery capture without consent.293 Florida, for example, prohibits 
any surveillance of a privately owned property, its owner, and 
anyone legally occupying the premise (landlord, tenant, or 
licensee).294 The Idaho statute prohibits capturing imagery of land 
and occupants without prior consent of the owner or the 
                                                
287 2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (establishing limitations on the use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles for surveillance). 
288 2015 Montana Laws ch. 261. 
289 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55 (West 2014). 
290  2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (H.B. 1328) (establishing limitations on the use 
of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance). 
291 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 423.008 (West 2013). 
292 Id.   
 293 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-
213 (West 2013). 
 294 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015). 
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occupant.295 Additionally, some states legitimately use drones over 
property for property appraisals, utility inspections, and mapping, 
if the DROP performs the “reasonable task” under a state 
occupational license.296 
Flying a drone over private property without consent can lead 
to a trespass claim against the DROP or a penalty. Some states 
allow a trespass claim after the landowner notifies the DROP about 
an unauthorized flight over the landowner’s land lower than 250 
feet.297 Texas, for example, creates a civil right of action against a 
violating DROP and allows a landowner to recover a penalty for 
every captured image or for distributing images.298 In Mississippi, a 
drone trespass is a “felonious trespass” when a DROP uses a drone 
to peep through a “window, hole, or opening.”299 For drone 
operation during live events, Tennessee prohibits unauthorized use 
with more than 100 guests attending a ticketed event.300 
3. Hunting 
Aside from privacy concerns, some states worry about the role 
of drones in the outdoors. States have enacted bills concerning 
hunting, fishing, and trapping. New Hampshire prohibits drone use 
with the intent to prevent lawful taking by hunters.301 Oregon, for 
example, prohibits drone use to interfere with hunting, trapping, 
and fishing.302 State statutes also prohibit drone use to aid in 
hunting. It is illegal to track, locate, and scout for wild animals303 
                                                
 295 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West 2013). 
 296 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015). 
 297 2015 Nev. Stat. ch. 327 (regulating operators of unmanned aerial vehicles 
in Nevada). 
 298 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.006 (West 2013). 
 299 2015 Miss. Laws ch. 489 (prohibiting “peeping tom” activities that do not 
amount to felonious trespass). 
 300 2015 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 240 (prohibiting unmanned aerial vehicles from 
capturing images at an event with more than 100 people). 
 301 2015 N.H. Laws ch. 38 (amending current animal harassment laws to 
include drone usage). 
 302 2015 Or. Laws ch. 61 (prohibiting the use of drones in pursuit of wildlife). 
 303 Id. 
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and to herd animals with a drone to hunt.304 Drone wildlife statutes 
prevent DROPs from interfering with others’ enjoyment of wildlife 
sports and from taking advantage of a drone to gain an upper hand 
in outdoor sport. The measures restricting what state or local law 
enforcement may do with drones are not preempted because of the 
traditionally strong state interest305 in regulating its own law 
enforcement bodies and the limited effect on air commerce. 
Likewise, the measures related to hunting are not preempted 
because of the traditional state interest306 in that subject. 
The Tennessee, Florida, Idaho, and Mississippi statutes present 
more interesting preemption questions, because they restrict the 
operations of civilian drones outside the hunting context. 
Tennessee’s prohibition of flying over major events can be 
justified by the state’s interest in public safety. Limitations on what 
people can do in connection with large public events are a 
traditional mainstay of state and local regulation.307 The Tennessee 
crowd overflight prohibition is congruent with the section 333 
exemption and (probable) eventual final-rule prohibition on flying 
over crowds. Tennessee could further justify its involvement as 
simply providing additional enforcement mechanisms for a 
federally established standard, similar to what happens when state 
law provides remedies for conduct that violates federal standard. 
On the other hand, a state crowd overflight restriction that goes 
well beyond the federal standard is more vulnerable to a 
preemption challenge. 
The prohibition against aerial imagery over property without 
the owner’s consent and of human subjects without their consent 
can be justified as an extension of traditional state measures to 
protect private property and personal privacy interests.308 These 
                                                
 304 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (West) 2015). 
 305 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 306 Id. 
 307 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (upholding, 
against First Amendment challenge, city regulation of noise emanating from 
concerts). 
 308 See supra note 100, and accompanying text (explaining deference to 
traditional state interests). 
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matters are generally left to the states and covered by extensive 
state regulation already. Many states already prohibit capturing or 
publishing images of persons without their consent.309 State 
overflight rules on this subject, however, are more vulnerable to 
preemption challenges when they extend the height below which 
permission is required. A limit of 250 feet places half of the FAA’s 
allowable height under off-limits, especially if it is accompanied 
by restrictions or overflight of public spaces. Such inconsistent 
height limits interfere with the federal regulatory regime and 
burden air commerce. 
These state privacy measures would fare better under 
preemption analysis if they simply extended existing state 
limitations on photographing individuals. Such measures do not 
single out drones or other aircraft for special restrictions. The case 
law is more hospitable to state regulation of general application. 
D. Space for Municipalities? 
Whether municipalities may regulate drones depends on 
whether the states of which they are a part may, and on how state 
law defines the relationship between the state and its subdivisions. 
The sovereignties in the United States’ constitutional structure 
are the federal government and the states, not municipalities.310 The 
states met at the Constitutional Convention and ceded some of 
their sovereign power to the United States; counties, towns, and 
cities were not at the table.311 
                                                
 309 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2015) (prohibiting commercial use of 
another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness without permission); 
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/30 (West 1999) (prohibiting commercial use 
of a person’s identity). The statute defines “identity” as “any attribute of an 
individual that serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable 
viewer or listener, including but not limited to (i) name, (ii) signature, (iii) 
photograph, (iv) image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice.” Id. at 1075/5.  
 310 Indian tribes also are sovereign, but their role in drone regulation is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
 311 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584–86 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (characterizing federalism under U.S. Constitution). 
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States started out with more sovereignty than they have now. 
They gave away some sovereignty—part of it upward to the 
national sovereign, and part of it downward to counties, cities, and 
towns. Counties and other municipalities enjoy only such powers 
as are granted by the sovereign state.312 The Civil War established 
that states, having ratified the United States Constitution, are not 
entitled to take back any of the sovereignty they ceded to the 
federal government.313 The states, in contrast, may take back the 
sovereignty they ceded downward to local units of government at 
any time. For example, a 2015 Maryland statute preempts 
municipal drone regulation.314 
Of course, if that state’s local government prerogatives are 
codified in that state’s constitution, the process for taking it back 
may be more arduous than simply passing a bill in one session of 
the Legislature.315 In some states, local government enjoys only 
those governmental authorities explicitly granted to them by state 
statute or constitutional provision, as was the case in Alabama for 
many years.316 The trend, however, is for states to adopt home rule 
legislation that grants general governmental power to 
                                                
 312 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 674 (1978) (explaining 
that municipalities derive all their powers from the state). 
 313 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 740 (1868) (noting that the Civil War 
rejected Texas’s sovereign right to secede). Secession is the complete recapture 
of sovereignty. Thus by rejecting secession, the Union’s victory in the Civil War 
impliedly rejected the power of a state to withdraw the cession of sovereignty to 
the federal government in the constitution. 
 314 MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301 (West 2015) (“Only the State may 
enact a law or take any other action to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the testing or 
operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the State. (C) Subsection (b) of this 
section: (1) preempts the authority of a county or municipality to prohibit, 
restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems; and 
(2) supersedes any existing law or ordinance of a county or municipality that 
prohibits, restricts, or regulates the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft 
systems.”). 
 315 City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 83 (Pa. 2004) (contrasting 
municipal home rule powers derived from state constitution with those derived 
from state statute). 
 316 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1127 n.64 (2007) 
(characterizing Alabama’s lack of meaningful home rule). 
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municipalities, roughly equivalent to that exercised by the state, 
unless a specific power is withheld in the home rule statute or by 
subsequent legislation.317 
V. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
Deciding what powers states and municipalities have to 
regulate drones does not exhaust the subject. Regulation arises, not 
only from economics, law, and good ideas, but also from politics 
and passion. 
A. Economics 
Two distinct markets exist for commercial microdrone 
activities. The first is the market for the vehicles themselves, and 
the second is the market for services provided by operators of 
those vehicles. The market for the vehicles is undeniably national 
and international in character. The dominant vendor for small 
drones in the United States is DJI, a Chinese company.318 United 
States vendors such as 3Drobotics,319 like their foreign 
counterparts, seek footholds in international markets. Allowing 
states to set different standards for vehicles would significantly 
interfere with the efficient functioning of these markets, and it 
would be even worse if regulations are made at the local level. It 
would be bad enough to need 50 different business plans and 
                                                
 317 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 
2277–2322 (2003) (analyzing history and competing philosophies of home rule); 
City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002) (describing 
home rule authority). 
 318 See Ryan Mac, Heng Shao & Frank Bi, Bow To Your Billionaire Drone 
Overlord: Frank Wang’s Quest To Put DJI Robots Into The Sky, FORBES (May 
6, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/05/06/dji-
drones-frank-wang-china-billionaire/ (providing profile of DJI and its 
competitive position). 
 319 See Chris Anderson, How I Accidentally Kickstarted the Domestic Drone 
Boom, WIRED MAGAZINE (Jun. 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/ 
06/ff_drones/ (providing profile of 3D Robotics by founder). 
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vehicle requirements, let alone 36,000 for municipalities.320 Of 
course, drone manufacturers and operators could use a “common 
denominator” model and adapt to the most stringent regulatory 
requirements in all their models, but that would increase costs. 
In contrast, the market for drone services is inherently local. 
The limited range of the available vehicles means that any 
particular mission is going to take place in a relatively small area. 
For example, an Amazon delivery drone could only deliver 
packages within the range of the battery flight time limitations. 
Thus, Amazon could only serve the market immediately adjacent 
to its warehouse and distribution offices. Even so, there are broader 
impacts. Depending on the altitudes at which they are flown, these 
local missions could pose collision risks to interstate and 
international airline and commercial operations. 
Also, economies of scale for marketing, finance, and 
operations management may lead commercial drone operators over 
time to expand, so they offer the same or similar services in more 
than one geographic area. One crew dispatcher for DROPs can 
handle more than one customer’s callouts. Promotional materials 
prepared for one local market can be made suitable for others. 
Investment promotion, cash management, accounting, purchasing, 
and liability insurance all represent fixed costs that can be shared 
among different local markets. 
The enterprise structure of the commercial helicopter industry 
is an analogy to how commercial drone operations will be 
structured; the markets and missions are, in many respects, similar. 
National or regional operations instead of purely local ones 
predominate for oil and gas exploration crew transportation, for 
medevac, for electronic newsgathering, and for much utility 
infrastructure inspection. To be sure, there are many purely local 
operators in each of these industry sectors, but they provide 
services mostly at the margins of their customers’ operations and 
of their own, flying an occasional utility patrol or event shot 
                                                
 320 Lists & Structures of Government, CENSUS.ORG, https://www.census.gov/ 
govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2015) (noting 
number of sub-county municipalities in the United States).  
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opportunistically in to fill out a portfolio of that offers flights for 
almost any purpose, frequently coupled with flight training as the 
mainstay business. 
Drone operator organizational structure also will depend, to 
some extent, on the organizational structure of the customers for 
drone services. An enterprise with a national or international 
footprint is likely to want to standardize drone services contracts 
across its geographically dispersed operations. It can do this, of 
course, while still allowing local decision-makers to contract with 
local operators, but the economies of scale from both buyers and 
sellers of drone services will push things toward arrangements of 
wider scope. 
Different operating rules in different parts of the country would 
be impediments to realizing these efficiencies. Even if compliance 
is not a problem—for example not flying over 200 feet in New 
York State, but up to 500 feet in Colorado; or being allowed to fly 
the drone from a moving vehicle in Nebraska but not in 
Michigan—finding out what the rules are if they vary from place 
to place would impose significant additional transaction costs for 
legal research and advice. 
B. Politics 
Politics will share the stage with law and economics in 
determining how regulatory power over drones will be allocated 
among the federal government, states, and municipalities. 
Microdrones will produce a clash over federalism when constituent 
or interest group pressures to draft drone legislation prove 
irresistible. Two different political issues exist: the politics of the 
content of state or local drone regulation, and the politics of 
federalism and federal preemption. Section IV.B discusses the 
politics of content. This section addresses the politics of 
federalism. 
The politics of federalism intersects with judicial appreciation 
of the need to give greater room for state regulation of federal 
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interests in areas where states traditionally have exercised power.321 
Most state and local lawmakers do not think much about 
preemption. Even if they are lawyers and recall the concept from 
law school and the bar exam, they are unlikely to have an 
appreciation of the analysis conducted in part III and its 
conclusion. Lawmakers, however, likely have a general 
understanding that some matters are mostly federal and some are 
mostly local. 
When lawmakers think of the subject as aviation regulation, 
they are likely to assume that it is a matter for the federal 
government. When the subject is zoning, other land-use 
regulations, nuisance, protection of personal privacy, and localized 
disorderly conduct, they assume it’s a matter for state or local 
regulation. Consider the following hypothetical: a state legislature 
or a city council has proposed legislation on its agenda, sponsored 
by one of its members in response to constituent pressure. The 
content of the measure may restrict drones, or it may encourage 
their expanded use, depending on local politics. 
The Maryland statute322 clearly is an example of the latter, but 
most of the others on the list in Part IV.C are examples of the 
former. The legislative body schedules hearings, and at some point, 
a hearing witness, another legislator, or staff counsel suggests that 
the measure might be preempted by federal law. That will surely 
come as a surprise. “You mean the federal government excludes us 
from aviation regulations all the way down to one centimeter over 
my backyard?” someone may ask. Then the battle is on—the FAA 
is extremely unlikely to accede to the proposition that it has 
anything less than exclusive authority all the way to the ground. 
1. Not in My Backyard 
Ultimately, as Part V explains, the boundary between federal 
and state regulation will be defined not by abstract legal principles, 
but by policy decisions made by federal, state, and local 
legislators. Their policy decisions will, of course, be informed by 
                                                
 321 See supra Part III. 
 322 See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
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politics operating at their particular level of government. An axiom 
of political science is that concentrated interests trump diffuse 
interests. Socially desirable projects such as cell phone towers, 
wind turbine farms, waste disposal sites, and electricity 
infrastructure “often succumb to a political process that yields to 
concentrated costs over diffuse benefits.”323 Organization matters 
and it is not easy to organize.324 
Regulation at the federal level favors well-organized national 
interests, most of whom are likely to be pro-drone: farmers,325 the 
press and media,326 realtors,327 electricity and gas utilities,328 
insurers,329 airlines,330 pilots,331 and railroads.332 It will be easier for 
                                                
 323 Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost 
Economizing Approach to Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and 
Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 29, 37 (2006) (explaining 
political economy of NIMBY); Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? 
Imperfect information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. 
L. REV. 917, 930–31 (1990) (summarizing literature on the greater political 
power of concentrated interests opposing diffuse interests); Michael A. Fitts, 
The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of 
the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1580–81 (1988) (summarizing 
theory of how concentrated interests bias legislative decision-making); 
 324 See Lucas R. White, Untangling the Circuit Splits Regarding Cell Tower 
Siting Policy and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7): When is a Denial of One Effectively a 
Prohibition on All?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981, 1987–88 (2013) (analyzing 
collective action problems in cell phone tower siting decisions). 
 325 See Political Power of the Agribusiness & Crop Insurance Lobbies, 
TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE (October 2012), http://www.taxpayer.net/ 
images/uploads/downloads/Political_Power_of_Farm_And_Crop_Insurance_Lo
bbies_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
 326 Commercial TV and radio stations spent $31.7 million on lobbying in 2014 
alone. Commercial TV & Radio Stations, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=C2100&year=2014 (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 327 The real estate industry spent $1.2 billion on lobbying from 1998 to 2015. 
Top Industries, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
lobby/top.php?indexType=i&showYear=a (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 328 Electric utilities spent $2 billion on lobbying from 1998-2015. Id. 
 329 See Health Care: A huge win for the insurance lobby, THE ECONOMIST, 
(Apr. 3, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ democracyinamerica/ 
2013/04/health-care (referring to “the immense power wielded by health 
insurers”. The insurance industry was the second ranked industry, after 
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drone manufacturers to exert political power at the national level 
rather than having to develop a presence at the state and municipal 
level. 
Does a role for states and municipalities mean more restrictions 
on desirable drone use because of the not-in-my-backyard 
phenomenon?333 Answering that question requires analysis of the 
political dynamics of local political decision-making, and that 
involves assessment of whether pro-drone or anti-drone interests 
are likely to be concentrated or diffuse. 
Yale political science professor Robert Dahl, in his classic 
1961 book, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American 
City, highlighted the role of local governmental institutions as 
mediators among conflicting interests groups, some of which had 
more power to influence the process than others. Dahl said that a 
political issue “can hardly be said to exist unless and until it 
commands the attention of a significant segment of the political 
stratum [the small segment of the population that is involved 
                                                                                                         
pharmaceuticals and health products in lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 
2015. Top Industries, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 327. 
 330 The air transport industry spent $1.1 billion on lobbying from 1998 to 
2015. Id. 
 331 Airline pilot unions spent more than $2 million on lobbying in 2014. Air 
transport unions, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=LT100&year=2014. 
 332 Railroads spent $ 34.3 million on lobbying in 2014. Railroads, CENTER 
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ indusclient.php? 
id=M04&year=2014. 
 333 “NIMBY, describes the situation where local citizens, organized 
community groups, and officials who want to benefit from an ‘essential 
infrastructure,’ such as wireless telecommunication facilities, but do not want 
the infrastructure located in their particular neighborhoods and communities.” 
Camille Rorer, Recent Development, Can You See Me Now? The Struggle 
between Cellular Towers and NIMBY, 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 213, 
216–17 (2004–05); See Hannah Wiseman, Expending Regional Renewal 
Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 483–84 (2011) (arguing that 
fragmentation of governmental authority prevents efficient land use for 
renewable energy; proposing regional structures). 
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regularly in politics].”334 An issue may take root because members 
of the political stratum get interested in it and influence other 
members to pay attention. It also may take root when the apolitical 
stratum experiences a vaguely felt need, and members of the 
political stratum formulate ways for the need to be addressed by 
political institutions.335 The vicissitudes of press and media 
attention drive awareness in both strata. A highly publicized drone 
accident, or a rescue of a lost child enabled by drone imagery 
would have this impact. 
One cannot predict political behavior in a particular unit of 
government without sophisticated public opinion polling of the 
population of that particular unit. Even then, predictions based on 
poll results are notoriously unreliable when political opinion is 
rapidly changing or when a particular issue is not very firmly in the 
public consciousness.336 Still, national polling suggests that the 
public attitude toward drones is unfavorable,337 likely fueled by a 
perception that civilian drones resemble military drones used in 
combat by the armed services and intelligence agencies—Predators 
and Reapers with thousands of pounds flying out of sight, at 
thousands of feet above the ground, and loitering for many hours to 
spy on or launch missiles at those below. 
Over time, the wider use of civilian microdrones will alter the 
public perception, but for now, the likelihood is great that negative 
public attitude, reinforced by the not-in-my-backyard phenomenon, 
will make state and local legislative bodies instinctively hostile to 
widespread use of microdrones. 
                                                
 334 Robert Alan Dahl, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY 92 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining crystallization of political issues). 
 335 Id. 
 336 See Everett Carll Ladd, A word on the limitations of polling, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, (May 20, 1988), http://www.csmonitor.com/1988/ 
0520/epoll-.html (summarizing limitations of political polls). 
 337 Alwyn Scott, Americans OK with police drones - private ownership, not so 
much: Poll, REUTERS, (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/ 
02/05/us-usa-drones-poll-idUSKBN0L91EE20150205 (reporting that 42% of 
2,000 respondents opposed private ownership and operation of drones, but 62% 
support police use for crime fighting). 
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Public concern about drones has been intensified by the FAA’s 
misleading public characterization of a database of drone sightings 
by manned aircraft pilots. In several press releases, the agency has 
characterized these reports as representing near-collisions between 
drones and helicopters or airplanes. The data show no such thing. 
A careful analysis by the Academy of Model Aeronautics shows 
that the database mostly reports mere drone sightings. In only one 
percent of the reports, did the pilot take evasive action, the routine 
maneuver to avoid a mid-air collision. Many of the reports were 
vague about what the pilot saw. In one case the pilot reported what 
“looked like a flying dog.”338 
For example, in May 2015, the Commissioners of the Chicago 
Park District considered a measure to prohibit drones from flying 
in Chicago’s extensive public parks without a permit.339 No 
mechanism for obtaining a permit existed. The initial measure was 
withdrawn from the agenda pending reconsideration at another 
meeting after model aircraft enthusiasts protested. Subsequently, 
counsel for the Park District carefully reviewed the law of federal 
preemption and crafted a more nuanced proposal, which is 
expected to be considered later in 2015.  
The City of Chicago has adopted an ordinance that represents a 
model for other municipalities.340 The ordinance exempts section 
333 exemption holders but subjects other operations to limitations 
similar to imposed by the FAA on commercial operations and by 
the AMA on hobbyists. It appropriately focuses local regulatory 
energies on the two problem areas: casual users ignorant of 
                                                
 338 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Report: FAA exaggerates drone ‘close calls’, 
RTDNA NEWSLETTER (Sep. 23, 2015 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/ 
report_faa_exaggerates_drone_close_calls; A Closer Look at the FAA’s Drone 
Data, ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/gov/ 
docs/AMAAnalysis-Closer-Look-at-FAA-Drone-Data_091415.pdf. 
 339 Board of Commissioners 5/13/2015 Meeting, CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, 
https://chicagoparkdistrict.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2283879&G
UID=C26DC8E7-CAA4-44B1-A9ED-E275409C6D92. 
340  Amendment of Municipal Code Title 9 by adding new Chapter 9-121 to 
regulate use of small unmanned aircraft in City airspace, SO2015-5419 
(approved by Aviation Committee, Nov. 12, 2015; enacted by City Council, 
Nov. 18, 2015). 
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aviation safety regulation, and commercial operators who flout 
federal regulation. It allows local law enforcement  to enforce 
federal rules by incorporating them into local law. The initial 
version would have banned all drone operations within the city 
limits unless the vehicles were registered with the city and the 
owner could prove insurance coverage. The version actually 
adopted eliminates the registration and insurance requirements.341 
In some communities, drone proponents will be well organized 
and influential, as they were in Chicago. Realtors,342 construction 
firms, and utilities, are alert and have drones high enough on their 
agendas that they are willing to make the effort. In some rural 
communities, agricultural interests that want to use drones will be 
influential. In most cases, however, it is more likely that 
concentrated opposition will trump diffuse supporters who do not 
know about the initiative or who do not want to go to the trouble of 
opposing it. 
2. Intellectual Capital 
Eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis famously observed that the 
genius of the federal structure of the United States is that states can 
serve as laboratories within which different regulatory approaches 
can be tried out.343 Moreover, having different local regulations has 
                                                
341  The authors of this article worked with the City Council and drone interest 
groups to revise the proposal before it came to a vote. Both testified in favor of 
the revised ordinance. Most of the testimony by other witnesses was favorable to 
drones, as well. 
 342 Realtors are well represented on zoning bodies. Accordingly their interest 
in using drones to market listed properties is concentrated relative to that of 
neighbors who may oppose drone operations for this purpose. But see Jerry L. 
Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the Wheel Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning 
Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447 (2004) (reporting on survey of members of Iowa 
zoning boards, data from which mostly refuted hypothesis of pro-development 
bias). 
 343 “Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.” New State Ice Co. 
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (invalidating, 
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its merits. For example, each region has its own environmental 
characteristics (weather and terrain) that rational drone rules 
should take into account. The conditions for drone operations and 
the risks they pose are different in rural and urban environments. 
The agenda of the state laboratories, however, is not 
determined by an intellectual exploration of facts and the public 
interest. It is determined by politics, and politics translates into 
policy only when intellectual capital links amorphous public desire 
to concrete legislative or regulatory language.344 
Drone regulation is unlike occupational safety and health345 and 
employment discrimination.346 In those areas, many states had 
mature effective programs before the national program was 
crafted. Drone regulation is completely different. Virtually all of 
the intellectual capital with respect to drone regulation has been 
developed under the premise that drones would be regulated 
nationally. 
As a result, few states or municipalities have given any serious 
thought to how drones should be regulated. Few interest groups 
have focused on drafting desirable state and local regulations. Most 
of the bills proposed have been impulsive, superficial, and 
motivated by ill-conceived public perceptions of the realities of 
drone flight. On a relatively new issue like drones, local decision-
makers are buffeted by public outcries animated by urban myth 
and overblown anecdotes about what might happen. Local decision 
makers go with the flow, as they lack firm intellectual or political 
anchors to resist or to shape public opinion. Overblown public 
response to new technologies is not unprecedented, however. The 
early days of the automobile set off a regulatory overreaction. For 
                                                                                                         
as violating substantive due process, state law restricting entry into ice 
business). 
 344 Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case 
of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1506–07 (2005) (explaining 
that groups at the margins of society may lack the necessary social and 
intellectual capital to influence events; qualities that elites possess in 
abundance). 
 345 See supra Part VI.A. 
 346 See supra Part VI.A. 
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example, a New York City cab driver was arrested and jailed for 
driving his electric taxi at the “breakneck speed” of 12 miles-per-
hour, and a Connecticut legislator introduced a bill to require 
drivers to come to a complete stop to avoid frightening horses.347 
State and local legislators are not irresponsible; they just lack 
resources to determine the facts. Interest groups provide essential 
technical support and intellectual capital to higher-level legislative 
bodies and forge long-standing relationships involving trust with 
the ample committee and personal staffs that support Congress. 
Interest groups frequently are impotent at lower levels of 
government, because they lack the resources to interact effectively 
with legislators, who often are part time, and have little, if any, 
staff support. 
VI. FUTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Uninhibited drone regulation at the state and, especially, at the 
local level will result in dramatically different regulatory regimes 
across the country, often the product of ill-informed local hysteria. 
The result would stifle innovation and realization of the benefits of 
new technologies. It also would bear little relationship to actual 
risks and their mitigation. 
Federal preemption of aviation safety regulation is motivated in 
large part by the need to prevent such evils. In addition to 
encouraging safety of air commerce, the FAA Administrator has a 
statutory duty to “encourage the development of civil 
aeronautics.”348 It is thus appropriate for the FAA not only to 
assure that state and local regulation does not interfere with its 
safety mandate, but also to assure that state and local regulations 
                                                
 347 Randy Alfred, May 21, 1901: Connecticut Sets First Speed Limit at 12 
MPH, WIRED (May 21, 2008,), http://archive.wired.com/science/discoveries/ 
news/2008/05/dayintech_0521. 
 348 49 U.S.C. § 40104 (2012); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(3) (2012) 
(“[FAA Administrator shall consider] encouraging and developing civil 
aeronautics, including new aviation technology”); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (c)(2) 
(2012) (“[FAA Administrator shall consider] the public right of freedom of 
transit through the navigable airspace”). 
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does not stifle innovation and the development of commercial 
drone markets. 
In considerable measure, the motivation for this article’s 
proposal is to give the FAA and Congress a way to respond to state 
and local political pressure to allow states and municipalities to 
regulate drones. Adoption of the proposal is far better for air 
commerce, the national airspace system, and local democracy than 
a shoving match among different levels of government, inevitably 
resulting in an outbreak of uncoordinated litigation in state and 
federal court. 
A. Mechanisms for Federal-State Cooperation 
Cooperative federal-state regulation is not uncommon. 
Mechanisms for sharing federal and state authority over the same 
subject matter are pillars of air pollution regulation, occupational 
safety and health regulation, and remedying employment 
discrimination. 
For example, the Clean Air Act distributes responsibility for 
setting and enforcing air-pollution standards among the federal 
EPA and state and local governments.349 Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 requires the complaints of employment 
discrimination be filed first with state anti-discrimination agencies, 
if they exist, before the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has jurisdiction.350 Congress, in crafting the 
federal Occupational and Safety Act, was reluctant to federalize 
workplace safety. Accordingly, it provided for a system of state 
implementation plans under federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) oversight.351 
                                                
 349 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation 
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 
211–12 (2004) (explaining allocation of federal, state, and local authority in 
state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act). 
 350 See Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1213–16 (1971) (criticizing deferral-state 
procedure). 
 351 See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(remanding OSHA regulations on staffing and funding of state implementation 
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B. Default: Federal Regulation and Preemption 
Default regulation for drones would comprise FAA regulations 
for DROP qualification, vehicle capabilities, and operating rules. A 
petition process would accommodate state and local governments 
who desire to play a role. A state or municipality (authorized by 
state law) could petition the FAA to regulate drones in certain 
airspace. The FAA would be required to grant the petition, so long 
as it meets the following interrelated criteria, to be considered 
collectively: 
1. It must show that the proposed state regulation involves 
matters traditionally of concern to the states; 
2. It must show that the proposed state regulation does not 
interfere with effective operation of the national airspace system, 
including drone integration into it; 
3. It must not interfere with the economies of scale necessary 
to allow drone commerce to develop in an unfettered market; 
4. It must impose performance rather than technical 
engineering standards. 
In effect, the regulatory regime would be an inversion of the 
state of affairs in mid-2015, when the default is a prohibition, and 
commercial operators must petition to fly. Under the proposal, the 
default would be permission to fly with units of state and local 
government empowered to petition to limit it. This arrangement 
could be authorized by statute, or it could be implemented under 
existing statutory authority. The FAA already has authority to 
decide when to regulate and when to stay its hand, and it also has 
authority to delegate its regulatory responsibility to others.352 For 
                                                                                                         
plans); Courtney M. Malveaux, OSHA Enforcement of the “As Effective As” 
Standard for State Plans: Serving Process or People?, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 323, 
324–25 (2011) (explaining that Occupational Safety and Health Act allows 
states to adopt their own implementation plans so long as they are at least as 
effective as federal standards). 
 352 See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d) (2012) ([authorizing FAA Administrator to 
delegate] “examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate 
under this chapter”); 14 C.F.R. § 183.1 (summarizing delegation of authority for 
issuing airman, operating, and aircraft certificates). 
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the most part, delegation now involves shifting authority to private 
persons, but there is no reason that the authority to delegate 
explodes delegation to state and local governmental authorities.353 
Moreover, the FAA frequently exercises the authority to leave 
certain areas within the scope of its statutory authority 
unregulated.354 Model aircraft operations were an obvious example 
before the 2012 statute withdrew FAA authority over the subject.355 
Commercial airline aircraft airstairs are another example, to 
borrow from case law.356 In effect, under the proposal, the FAA 
would delegate its authority to particular states in the space and to 
the extent that that the state proposes. It would withhold its 
authority to impose its own rules in that space and to that extent. 
The concept could be implemented in the final rule for 
microdrones. It was not disclosed in the proposed rule, however, 
and therefore it has not received the public comment the 
Administrative Procedure Act envisions.357 If the rule is deferred, 
the federal government will have a considerable head start in 
regulating microdrones—exactly the opposite of the experience 
with occupational safety and health and employment 
discrimination regulation. That is not necessarily negative, as the 
initial increment of federal regulation could produce data about 
and what does and does not work, where state supplementation of 
the regulatory framework is most desirable. 
The default position of federal regulation, while leaving the 
initiative to states and municipalities to pose exactly what they 
want to regulate, is that Congress, or the FAA, need not make 
guesses as to what is well suited for state and local regulation and 
what will satisfy state and local desires. If a state want to exclude 
drones from certain areas of geography, it can propose to do so. 
                                                
 353 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP 
Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143, 158–61 (2015) (analyzing FAA 
authority to delegate). 
 354 See supra Part III.C. 
 355 See supra Part IV.B. 
 356 See supra Part III.C. 
 357 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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C. FAA Authority to Approve a State Plan 
This section discusses some legal justification that would allow 
state or local rules to coexist with federal law on drones. 
1. Unusual Local Interest 
The first possibility would build on the Commerce Clause 
doctrine and federal-preemption analysis that allows states a wider 
ambit of regulatory authority alongside, or instead of, the federal 
government in areas traditionally within the state police power: 
land-use regulations, personal privacy, and other areas of common 
law torts. A state petition that imposes insurance requirements, or 
tort rules for imposing liability arising from drone accidents, would 
be viewed favorably under this criterion. A petition that addresses 
traffic separation, DROP qualification, or vehicle standard would 
not. 
2. Non-Interference with the National Airspace System (NAS) 
The second consideration involves assessing the state proposal 
in terms of its effect on the efficient and safe operation of the 
national airspace system. A state proposal to exclude drones from 
the airspace below treetop and powerline level over private 
property without permission would be viewed favorably under this 
criterion because it would have little effect on national airspace 
system operations and on most legitimate drone flight; indeed it is 
not clear that anyone is permitted to fly a manned aircraft or a 
drone below treetop and powerline level about private property 
under existing if FARs, under the NPRM, or under the Section 333 
exemptions. 
On the other hand, a blanket ban on drones over the entire 
territory of a municipality would interfere with the efficient and 
safe operation of the national airspace system, given that Congress 
has declared that commercial drone operations are a part of the 
national airspace system, subject only to compliance with FAA 
rules to ensure safe integration. 
3. No Adverse Effect on Economies of Scale 
The third criterion would require a showing by the state that its 
rules can be accommodated without commercial drone operators 
having to have separate business plans and operating programs for 
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each local area in the United States. It also could be heightened by 
showing that a state or local government proposes to adopt uniform 
or model rules proposed by an entity like the Uniform 
Commissioners on National State Laws, the National Association 
of Attorneys General, or some other private group. Satisfaction of 
this criterion also would exist if a petitioner shows that compliance 
with the rules impinges only slightly on likely commercial drone 
operations. Restricting low-level flight over backyards is an 
example of where impingement is low. Exposing certain purposes 
such as harassment to after-the-fact liability would be another 
example. 
On the other hand, a state or municipal regulatory regime that 
limits the kinds of vehicles that can be flown would be suspect 
under this criterion. It would have the effect of requiring drone 
operators with more than a local footprint to select their fleets to 
accommodate a patchwork quilt of potentially inconsistent vehicle 
requirements. Local imposition of DROP and other crew member 
qualification requirements would be suspect for the same reason. 
Any system that requires advance approval of drone flight would 
be inconsistent with this criterion because it would increase the 
transaction costs to know what the advance approval requirements 
are and to alter operations to comply with them. Advance approval 
for specific flights would be considerably worse in this regard than 
blanket approval for flights during a defined period of time, such 
as a year. 
4. Plausible Risk Basis and Performance Orientation 
The fourth criterion is related to the first. The risks that a 
petitioner identifies should be explicitly and logically linked to the 
interests cited under the first criterion. The analysis would 
resemble that used in the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
analysis to demonstrate a nexus between limitations on human 
activity and legitimate state interests.358 
                                                
 358 See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985) (summarizing rational basis test). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The availability of small inexpensive drones has resulted in 
thousands of people flying them for fun and for business. Farmers, 
electric utilities, pipeline companies, photographers, moviemakers, 
television producers, public-safety organizations, and television 
stations are regularly using them to collect aerial imagery when 
helicopters and airplanes are too expensive or cannot be flown 
safely. Despite the obvious utility of drones, casual users have 
alarmed the public and the traditional aviation community, who 
fear injury to people on the ground, invasion of personal privacy, 
and midair collisions with other aircraft. 
Aviation safety has been understood for more than 50 years to 
be a matter exclusively reserved for regulation by the federal 
government. The FAA has been slow to develop a regulatory 
framework, but now it has begun that process in earnest, approving 
more than 1,500 specific commercial operations, and publishing a 
46-page proposed rule in the Federal Register. 
Meanwhile, state statutes and local ordinances are breaking out 
all over the country. While many of these are preempted by federal 
law, not all of them are. A careful and well-informed effort by state 
and local legislative bodies to understand the risk and appreciate 
the particular role that states can play to supplement federal 
regulation can improve public safety without strangling this 
revolutionary new aviation technology in its cradle. 
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